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1 Introduction 
1.1 Presenting the Topic 
During the last decades an overall environmental awareness has evidently emerged among the 
world’s citizens as well as the countries as such. As a consequence of this development 
environmental issues have been subject to new regulations at a domestic as well as an interna-
tional level. As a reaction to the development of an increasing number of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and their provisions including trade affecting measures, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), has become forced to consider environmental issues. 
Consequently, the top interest of the WTO to liberalize world trade is set against the urgent 
need of protecting the environment. This tension between trade and environmental policies 
has given rise to an extensive debate and one interesting question is whether it is possible to 
cumulatively liberalize trade and introduce a higher protection for the environment.
1
 This 
development is also of immediate interest to the ongoing Doha Round, which is the first WTO 
round to directly deal with environmental concerns. The relationship between the WTO and 
MEAs has lately been lively debated. Several proposals have been made in attempt to clarify 
the relationship, but so far no consensus has been reached. 
 
As environmental concerns mainly are left outside the WTO system these issues instead are 
left to be dealt with in other international agreements. Therefore, MEAs are essential as to 
regulate provisions for the protection of the global environment and to address important 
environmental problems. Examples of issues addressed in MEAs are air pollution, biodiver-
sity, climate change and hazardous waste disposal. Environmental issues like these constitute 
examples of issues that can not be addressed accurately on a national level. To solve or at 
least decrease these problems international efforts will have to be made.
2
 Today more than 
250 MEAs are in force regulating environmental issues and of these around 30 may affect 
trade.
3
 Although sustainable development, involving environmental aspects, always has 
worked as a principle of trade liberalization the recent development with an increasing 
number of MEAs has increased the intensity of the debate concerning linkages between trade 
and non-economic issues and the relationship between WTO rules and specific trade obliga-
                                                 
1
 Biermann, F, The Rising Tide of Green Unilateralism in World Trade Law, Options for Reconciling the 
Emerging North-South Conflict, page 421. 
2
 Alam, S, Trade Restrictions Pursuant to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Developmental Implications 
for Developing Countries, page 983. 
3
 Brack, D and Gray, K, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO, page 4f.  
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tions set out in MEAs. This as a consequence of that those MEAs often conflict with 
fundamental principles of the WTO system.
4
  
 
Potential as well as factual conflicts may arise on several levels between the WTO system and 
provisions set out in MEAs. Measures that are permitted or accepted in one agreement can be 
forbidden in another. Furthermore, potential conflicts often arise already before national 
environmental measures are imposed or even when new agreements are negotiated. The 
impact of the WTO may also have an effect on decision makers and negotiators, who may 
hesitate to decide on rules and programmes as a consequence of that they may be questioned 
before the WTO.
5
 
 
Conflicts may arise concerning which dispute-settling mechanism that shall have the jurisdic-
tional power as well as which law that shall be applicable before that mechanism. Such 
conflicts are possible as a consequence of that provisions of MEAs might be considered when 
interpreting WTO law. Due to such jurisdictional conflicts the certainty achieved by interna-
tional relations can be disrupted.
6
 To date, it is mainly the WTO that has a powerful and effec-
tive dispute settlement mechanism as well as the possibility to use sanctions against wrong-
doing parties.
7
 As the WTO may not be the most appropriate organ to cope with complicated 
environmental issues there is a risk for that the objectives of MEAs may be neglected.   
 
No formal dispute involving a measure under a MEA has yet been brought to the WTO. 
Nevertheless, the complexity of the relationship between environmental and trade rules has 
been highlighted.
8
 However, several disputes concerning environmental issues have been 
brought before the WTO dispute-settling mechanism, which over time has opened up to 
demands relating to environmental protection.
9
 Consequently, the last years’ decisions from 
the WTO dispute-settling mechanisms show a higher acceptance for international environ-
mental agreements when deciding measures acceptability according to WTO rules. This 
                                                 
4
 Busse, M, Trade, Environmental Regulations and the World Trade Organization: New Empirical Evidence, 
page 299. 
5
 Ekelöf, G, Miljön på undantag - de internationella miljöavtalen och WTO, page 7. 
6
 Marceau, G and González-Calatayud, A, The Relationship Between the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of 
MEAs and those of the WTO, in Schalatek, L, Trade and Environment, the WTO, and MEAs, Facets of a 
Complex Relationship, page 71.   
7
 Ekelöf, G, Miljön på undantag - de internationella miljöavtalen och WTO, page 7. 
8
 See Chile - Measures affecting the Transit and Importing of Swordfish and European Communities - Trade 
Description of Sardines. 
9
 The Doha mandate on multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), and Busse, M, Trade, Environmental 
Regulations and the World Trade Organization: New Empirical Evidence, page 299. 
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development is positive from an environmental perspective. At the same time it is, however, 
problematic that the relationship between the respective rules and regulations of the WTO and 
MEAs is not clarified in a more defining way.
10
  
 
The relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in MEAs 
is one topic that is aimed to be explicitly treated during the Doha round.
11
 Even though this 
tense relationship, for many years now, has been subject to discussions in several forums, 
such as the WTO and FN, no acceptable solution has been found. As an example the WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) has examined the relationship since 1995, yet 
without any real result. Even though the Doha Round explicitly is meant to deal with this rela-
tionship their mandate is limited as to some specific MEAs and even to specific measures. 
Another important limitation is that only the parties of a specific MEA are concerned. In 
addition, the negotiations are complicated by developing countries’ fear for that the introduc-
tion of environmental provisions into the WTO system is grounded in protectionist purposes 
for the developed countries.
12
 In theory, this relationship should not really be as problematic, 
as MEAs regulate multilateral measures and not unilateral ones, just like the WTO. Therefore, 
arbitrary and discriminatory behaviour should be avoided to a greater extent.
13
 Additionally, it 
could be of interest to mention that conflicts of norms have been subject to rather extensive 
discussions while conflicts of jurisdictional matters only have been debated to a rather limited 
extent.
14
  
 
1.2 Purpose and Demarcation 
The purpose of this paper is to deal with the problematic and tense relationship between the 
WTO system and MEAs. Even though, as mentioned, no factual dispute yet has been brought 
before the WTO dispute-settling mechanisms this relationship is of great importance as there 
is a significant risk for future conflicts. As a consequence, of the absence of a factual conflict, 
the discussion concerning how such conflicts shall be resolved becomes speculative. Never-
theless, the discussion is essential as parties as well as non-parties to the agreements need the 
relationship to be foreseeable. For this purpose they need to know how the agreements should 
                                                 
10
 Ekelöf, G, Miljön på undantag - de internationella miljöavtalen och WTO, page 7f.  
11
 WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 31.  
12
 Ekelöf, G, Miljön på undantag - de internationella miljöavtalen och WTO, page 8.  
13
 Brack, D and Gray, K, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO, page 7. 
14
 Marceau, G and González-Calatayud, A, The Relationship Between the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of 
MEAs and those of the WTO, in Schalatek, L, Trade and Environment, the WTO, and MEAs, Facets of a 
Complex Relationship, page 71.   
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be interpreted as to not cause negative affects on for example the effectiveness with the objec-
tives of a specific MEA. Besides conflicts of norms also jurisdictional conflicts are meant to 
be treated within the purpose of this paper. To illustrate the practical effects of factual and 
possible conflicts this study will involve case-studies of two MEAs, namely the Convention 
of International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, this study is not meant to treat all kinds of possible conflicts why 
only some examples are presented.    
 
To fulfil the stated purpose of this paper the following questions will be analyzed: 
 Which conflicts of norms may arise between the WTO system and provisions set out 
in MEAs?  
 Which conflicts of jurisdictions may arise between the dispute settlement mechanisms 
of the WTO and those of MEAs?  
 How should these conflicts be solved and which rules of international law, other than 
WTO law, should be considered? 
 How should the relationship between the WTO and MEAs be clarified?  
 Concerning the case-studies; which conflicts may arise between CITES/the Kyoto 
Protocol and the rules of the WTO? How should these conflicts be solved and which 
rules of international law, other than WTO law, should be considered?  
 
CITES and the Kyoto Protocol have been chosen as they may conflict with the WTO regime 
in different ways. Moreover, they are because of their environmental connection of immediate 
interest to the ongoing environmental debate. CITES conflicts directly with the provisions of 
the WTO, thereby it can illustrate an example of factual conflicts which may arise between 
the WTO system and a MEA. Regarding the Kyoto Protocol it is of great relevance as the 
current one expires by 2012 and discussions are being held in order to conclude a new 
protocol. The Kyoto Protocol may conflict with the WTO system in several ways and 
therefore it can make a valid contribution to this paper showing examples of potential 
conflicts that may arise between the WTO rules and a MEA.  
 
1.3 Method  
To fulfil the indicated purpose of this paper material in form of primary sources in form of 
conventions and treaties have been treated. Additionally, secondary sources such as books, 
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articles and reports have been used. The majority of these sources constitute of articles and of 
those the majority are collected from the Journal of World Trade. Moreover, the homepage of 
the WTO and other international internet sites have been of importance. However, some 
books, such as Pauwelyn’s Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law 
Relates to Other Rules of International Law, have made an important contribution to this 
paper. The material has been used to illustrate the line of reasoning and to support the 
arguments handled in this paper. The material has been tried to be approached critically in 
order to decrease the risk of presenting personal pre-understandings and the like. 
 
1.4 Disposition  
Initially, the core principles of the WTO, environmental issues within the WTO system and 
some general statements concerning MEAs will be presented. In addition, the definition of 
conflict and possible conflicts that may arise between the WTO agreements and MEAs will be 
treated. Moreover, possible jurisdictional conflicts will be treated why the dispute-settling 
systems of the WTO as well as those of MEAs’ will be examined. Additionally, common 
principles of international law, on how the WTO agreements should be interpreted, will be 
presented. Later on case-studies of CITES and the Kyoto Protocol will follow. Furthermore, 
approaches on how to clarify this tense relationship and how to develop the dispute resolution 
of the WTO as well as MEAs as to better handle disputes involving environmental issues, will 
be studied. Finally, certain conclusions will be drawn. 
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2 Background   
2.1 Core Principles of the WTO  
The primarily aim with the WTO system is to liberalize international trade.
15
 Apart from 
providing a common set of international trade rules, the WTO system is meant to offer an 
effective dispute-settling system facilitating the settlement of trade disputes among its 
member nations.
16
  
 
The core principles of the WTO system are expressed in the original General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947. Of those the most vital ones include the Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN) principle, expressed in article I of the GATT, requiring the members to treat 
products from other members in the same way. Moreover, the principle on national treatment 
in article III requires members to treat any imported product in the same way as domestic 
“like products” would be treated. This principle shall prevent that domestic products will 
secure market advantages through imposing discriminatory measures on imported products. 
Additionally, article XI, involves a prohibition on quantitative restrictions, aiming at 
prohibiting quotas, embargoes, and licensing schemes on imported as well as exported 
products. If any of the core principles, like the ones mentioned, is violated a claim of any 
WTO member could be justified trough a general exception under article XX. These excep-
tions are only permitted when the measures are shown not to be applied in a manner 
constituting means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade. However, articles 
XX (b) and XX (g), which are the ones with relevance for an environmental perspective, do 
only apply to violations of general WTO obligations and not to every measure imposed for 
environmental protection.
17
 These exceptions will be further treated below. 
 
2.2 Environmental Issues within the WTO  
Even though the foremost aim of the WTO is to liberalize trade the WTO agreements contain 
measures making environmental considerations possible, as the exceptions in article XX of 
the GATT. The commitment to the objective of sustainable development, which was 
recognised already in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, signed in 1994, was 
reaffirmed through the Doha Declaration in 2001. Moreover, it was stated in the Doha 
                                                 
15
 Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
16
 Caldwell, J, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT/WTO Regime, in Schalatek, L, Trade and 
Environment, the WTO, and MEAs, Facets of a Complex Relationship, page 41. 
17
 Ibid., page 41f. 
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Declaration “that the aims of upholding and safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory 
multilateral trading system, and acting for the protection of the environment and the promo-
tion of sustainable development can and must be mutually supportive”.18 Consequently, as 
long as certain requirements are fulfilled, national measures for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health, or of the environment, will be respected.
19
 Moreover, the CTE 
discusses trade and environmental issues and has so far fulfilled more than hundred reports.
20
 
However, none of these reports has been pursued by the WTO itself.
21
  
 
Environmental issues as well as other non-economic issues have naturally in some aspects 
become regulated within the WTO system. The general exceptions of article XX of the GATT 
allows members to take non-economic values and interests, that compete or conflict with free 
trade, into account. Through this possibility WTO members could be allowed to deviate from 
basic rules and disciplines of the WTO regarded that certain conditions are met.
22
 According 
to article XX “the commitments entered into by the Contracting Parties were not meant to 
prevent them from adopting measures…(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health;…(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources…”, (for example 
endangered species of animals or plants)
23
. The WTO provisions for environmental protection 
cover only product-related measures why process-related requirements are to be left outside 
the scope of the WTO.
24
 Nevertheless, such requirements have been considered before the 
WTO dispute-settling mechanisms.  
 
Article XX provides exceptions from violations of all GATT obligations why the measures 
that can be subject to a dispute may vary greatly. The adjudicating bodies of the WTO have 
established a “necessity test” for their decisions on whether a general exception in article XX 
shall justify an infringement of any of the GATT obligations. This decision involves a process 
of weighing and balancing of the following factors; the importance of the common interests or 
values that the measure aim to protect, the effectiveness of the measure in pursuing the aimed 
policies and the following impact of the regulation on imports or exports. Naturally, the 
“necessity” requirement will be easier fulfilled the more essential the aimed polices are and 
                                                 
18
 WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 6.  
19
 Emmert, F, Labor, Environmental Standards and World Trade Law, page 127. 
20
 See for instance WT/CTE/WI-100 and WT/CTE/I-3. 
21
 Wiers, J, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO, A Legal Analysis, page 15. 
22
 Van den Bossche, P, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization,  page 43 and Wiers, J, Trade and 
Environment in The EC and the WTO, A Legal Analysis, page 178. 
23
 United States - Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Turtle Products. 
24
 Georgieva, K and Mani, M, Trade and the Environment Debate: WTO, Kyoto and Beyond, page 3. 
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the more appropriate the measure applied is in fulfilling that purpose.
25
 The measure shall, 
according to the panels, be the “least GATT-inconsistent measure reasonably available”. As a 
measure is either GATT-consistent or GATT-inconsistent, it has been promoted that this 
statement should be equivalent to the “least trade restrictive” measure, then enabling a further 
consideration of the GATT objectives. Additionally, the necessity test could be said to appear 
as a strict proportionality test because of the weighing and balancing included in the test.
26
  
 
In the Tuna-Dolphin
27
 dispute between the US and Mexico, tuna caught with a certain method 
causing unnecessary harm on dolphins, was embargoed with reference to the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act. This embargo was seen by Mexico as conflicting with the prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions in article XI of the GATT. The panel suggested that the general 
exceptions were to be applicable only to measures protecting resources within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the enacting state. The panel concluded that trade affecting measures for 
environmental purposes would threaten the furtherance of free trade liberalization, constitut-
ing the foremost aim of the WTO regime, through giving incitements for green protectionism. 
However, the ruling was never adopted. Another Tuna-Dolphin panel was established. 
Neither this ruling was adopted as a legally binding dispute settlement.  
 
Initially, article XX of the GATT was understood as deciding any conflicts between free-trade 
rules and environmental norms in favor of the former. The Tuna-Dolphin panels tried to 
enhance this view, even though it conflicted with the wording of the GATT treaty. However, 
these concerns were taken into account only concerning the effects from a free trade perspec-
tive. Consequently, this ruling raised concerns about the balancing of competing values in the 
trading system and a view of the GATT as putting the interest of trade liberalization above all 
other human concerns.
28
  
 
In contrast to the Tuna-Dolphin panel the Appellate Body stated in the Shrimp-Turtle
29
  ruling 
that the wording of article XX did not by itself mean impermissibility in the content of 
allowing trade measures to protect the global environment. Two requirements have to be 
                                                 
25
 Marceau, G, and González-Calatayud, A, The Relationship Between the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of 
MEAs and those of the WTO, in Schalatek, L, Trade and Environment, the WTO and MEAs, page 72. 
26
 Wiers, J, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO, A Legal Analysis, page 240f and Canada - 
Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Salmon and Herring, 35
th
 Supp. 98. 
27
 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel. 
28
 Howse, R, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and 
Environment Debate, page 2. 
29
 United States - Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Turtle Products.  
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fulfilled, namely the measure must be covered by one of the exceptions set out in article XX 
and be applied consistently with the preamble to article XX. The latter requirement involves 
an application neither giving rise to unjustified or arbitrary discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, nor creating a disguised restriction on international trade.  
 
In the Shrimp-Turtle ruling a complaint against the United States was fielded by India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand in 1996. In this case it was required, through a US court 
decision, to enforce guidelines under Section 609 without geographical limitation. This were 
to result in an import ban on shrimp or products of shrimp if harvested, irrespectively of 
where, with commercial fishing technology risking to affect adversely some species of sea 
turtles. Sea turtles were, through Section 609, aimed to be protected and conserved by 
initiating negotiations for the development of bilateral as well as multilateral agreements for 
that purpose. Additionally, so called Turtle Excluder Devices were required to be used by 
shrimp trawlers. If foreign governments met these conditions, the import ban could be 
escaped by gaining a certificate on an annual basis.  
 
When questioned before the Appellate Body it was concluded that these measures constituted 
an unjustifiably and arbitrarily discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail as certain Asian countries had been treated differently. Accordingly, it was found 
inconsistent with article XX of the GATT. Even though the result was favoured, the reasoning 
of the Appellate Body, as to include issues of non-product-related process and production 
methods (PPMs), was considered to go beyond the judiciary body’s mandate.30 However, 
turtles were found to constitute an “exhaustible nature recourse”. The particular turtle species 
were listed in CITES and it was further promoted that the wording “exhaustible nature 
recourse” is to be interpreted in an evolutionary way, in the context of the objective of 
sustainable development, as referred to in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement.    
 
The Appellate Body stated, concerning the requirements for import/export ban applied by the 
US, that the overall structure of article XX would not prevent a member from conditioning 
imports on whether members comply with or adopt a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed 
by the importing member. Process-but-not-policy based measures do not violate any operative 
provision of the GATT why article XX is not necessary to justify them. Regulations treating 
                                                 
30
 Shaw, S and Schwartz, R, Trade and Environment in the WTO, State of Play, page 146f.  
- 14 - 
 
products differently because of differences in their process of production are generally 
understood to be per se violations of the GATT and not possible to justify under article XX.
31
 
Additionally, no ruling has explicitly treated a process-based measure as consistent with the 
principle of national treatment. However, it can be added that the Appellate Body, through its 
EC - Asbestos
32
 ruling, has enabled process-based measures, as long as applied in a non-
discriminatory manner, to be in consistence with article III:4 of the GATT.
33
 
 
The involvement of goals of sustainable development and environmental protection in the 
Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement made the outcome in the Shrimp-Turtle case possible. 
Through this ruling new possibilities have emerged. However, the scope of the exceptions 
contained in article XX (b) and (g) of the GATT will continue to be controversial and 
problematic for the WTO dispute-settling mechanisms.
34
 Conclusively, the Shrimp-Turtle 
ruling can be said to provide “a principled basis for upholding multilateral and bilateral 
environmental agreements under article XX (b) and (g)”.35 If interpreted in a pro-
environmental manner the requirements of these exceptions can be argued to uphold multi-
lateral as well as bilateral environmental agreements. As long as the agreements do not 
contain “substantial flaws or disguised protectionist measure” the requirements of the 
preamble would be met.
36
 
 
Conclusively, measures conflicting with the core principles of the WTO can be justified with 
reference to the general exceptions in article XX of the GATT. Those exceptions are normally 
determined on a case-by-case basis by a WTO panel but there is a possibility for the WTO 
Secretariat to submit interpretations of standards. However, the range of interpretations made 
by WTO panels concerning the exceptions contained in article XX further complicates the 
relationship between the WTO and MEAs why an immediate clarification of the scope of the 
exceptions included in article XX is of great importance.
37
 Furthermore, a measure’s justifi-
cation under article XX of the GATT could be influenced on whether the measure is applied 
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in accordance with a MEA. However, the measure can never be applied if not aiming at 
protecting essential environmental concerns and constituting any disguised protectionist 
measure. Furthermore, the justification of article XX may depend on how the MEA in ques-
tion is participated and complied with as it could influence the judging of the good faith 
principle. Also some unilateral actions can, however, be justified according to the general 
exceptions, even in the absence of an applicable MEA.
38
 
 
2.3 Multilateral Environmental Agreements  
Currently more than 250 MEAs are in force regulating different environmental issues. The 
memberships’ of these MEAs vary from relatively small groups to up to more than 180 count-
ries. Therefore, the impact of these MEAs is rather big and worldwide.
39
 Of these MEAs 
thirty-one are listed by the WTO Secretariat as containing potential trade measures. Some of 
these are regional and protocols are included along with their parent conventions under single 
headings.
40
 Despite the fact that international environmental agreements, involving trade 
affecting measures, have existed since 1870, the majority of the MEAs have been negotiated 
during the last decades. This increase in MEAs is a result of the development of environ-
mental problems with global implications over the last years as well as the following urgent 
need for multilateral solutions among sovereign nations to address such threats to the global 
environment. Another cause for this development is the realization of the fact that environ-
mental problems do not solely concern environmental issues, but interact with other issues 
such as trade.
41
  
 
2.3.1 Trade Affecting Measures 
In the following some examples of trade affecting measures that could be included in MEAs 
will be presented. Trade affecting provisions aim at regulating and controlling or prohibiting 
environmentally harmful trade.
42
 Such measures can be of widely varieties in forms of for 
example bans or embargoes. Furthermore, they could include reporting requirements, 
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labelling or other identification requirement, requirement for movement documents, targeted 
and general export and/or import bans as well as market transformation measures.
43
  
 
These measures can be either explicitly set out in the MEA or derive from a decision of the 
parties after the MEA has entered into force. Additionally, a measure can be either specific or 
non-specific. A specific measure is normally described in the MEA itself and constitutes 
normally of mandatory obligations.
44
 The categories of product-specific measures in MEAs 
are in general designed to fulfill one of the three following aims. One category aims at 
prohibiting or limiting the trade in a “target” product or substance of the MEA in question. 
Secondly, a measure could aim at establishing a regulatory framework in order to regulate 
trade in the specifically targeted product or substance covered by the MEA. Lastly, the 
measure could be imposed as to limiting markets in goods contributing to the environmental 
problem. This could be done through allowing trade restrictions, thus, reducing the interna-
tional market demand for these products.
45
  
 
On the other hand, non-specific measures are not explicitly described in the MEAs. Such 
measures are applied even alongside other measures as to comply with obligations or fulfil 
MEA objectives.
46
 Another category of measures aims at creating incentives to encourage 
participation in the MEA. This is made though the creation of incentives for non-parties to 
become parties to an agreement. The same concerns the achievement of full implementation 
of the agreement’s obligations. Additionally, a measure imposed through a MEA may aim at 
discouraging “free-riders” of the MEA as those non-members cause several different 
problems for the members of the agreement. Such free-riders could gain from MEAs’ 
environmental benefits without having to pay any of the costs. Naturally, MEA memberships 
will be less sought for if non-compliance of free-riders is shown to be beneficial. On the 
contrary, these memberships have to be strengthened by eliminating free-riders as to benefit 
the international work with improving the environment.
47
 
  
                                                 
43
 Brack, D and Gray, K, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO, page 5f. 
44
 Ibid., page 6. 
45
 Caldwell, J, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT/WTO Regime, in Schalatek, L, Trade and 
Environment, the WTO, and MEAs, Facets of a Complex Relationship, page 43f. 
46
 Brack, D and Gray, K, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO, page 6. 
47
 Caldwell, J, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT/WTO Regime, in Schalatek, L, Trade and 
Environment, the WTO, and MEAs, Facets of a Complex Relationship, page 45. 
- 17 - 
 
3 Conflicts of Norms and Jurisdictions  
Conflicts may arise where WTO rules conflict with other provisions of public international 
law and where other tribunals make concurring claims. The need for a clarification of the 
relationship between these set of rules of international law and these international tribunals is 
evident due to the increased interaction between WTO law and other sources of international 
law as well as the increased reluctance to invoke non-WTO law before the WTO adjudicating 
bodies. In the following the diversities of this relationship will be treated. It is vital to bear in 
mind that the jurisdictional limitation, regarding which disputes that can be drawn under the 
dispute settlement of the covered agreements, accounted for in article 1.1 of the DSU, has to 
be separated from the matter of which law that could be applicable under the DSU.
48
 
 
3.1 Definition of Conflict  
Initially, the definition of conflict shall be examined. What constitutes a conflict is naturally 
of relevance for the discussion concerning the relationship between the WTO system and 
MEAs. A supposed conflict may only constitute a divergence that can be streamlined through 
treaty interpretation.
49
 On the other hand, factual conflicts between two provisions have to be 
solved through that one of them has to be set aside, either through suspension or arrogation. 
However, if no conflict is at hand it can be concluded that the provisions are cumulative and 
shall be applied simultaneously. This can be done as a result of the presumption of the 
principle of good faith and the fact that states are obliged to implement their international 
obligations accordingly. Furthermore, the risk for a conflict over a specific provision seems 
more likely than a general conflict. A general conflict is at hand when a party can not comply 
with two treaties simultaneously, as one treaty prohibits what is allowed in the other or 
requires an opposite course of action.
50
 On the contrary, a specific conflict would probably 
not cause an entire conflicting treaty to be null and void, but instead bring about a suspension 
or extinction of a particular set of obligations thereunder or even an engagement of the state 
responsibility of those states setting aside provisions of a multilateral agreement. International 
law sets out some criteria that shall be met for a conflict to be at hand. Firstly, two states have 
to be bound by either two treaties or different obligations which must cover the same substan-
                                                 
48
 Bartels, L, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, page 502f.  
49
 Pauwelyn, J, Conflicts of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law, page 6.   
50
 Jenks, W, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, page 426. 
- 18 - 
 
tive issue. Additionally, these provisions must conflict, as imposing mutually exclusive 
obligations.
51
  
 
According to Pauwelyn there are two conditions of conflict that have to be fulfilled before 
looking at the identification of conflicts. Initially, the bound parties as well as the subject 
matter cannot be completely different; some overlap must exist regarding some of these two 
matters. Thus, it is enough that one part is bound by both rules. The rules have to interact as to 
be applicable concerning a special matter at the same time. It is not relevant whether the 
interaction of the rules is at hand for a long or short period. Even though there is no interac-
tion of rules at the same time queries can arise concerning “which of several norms prevailing 
at different moments in time should apply to a particular case”. However, no factual conflict 
is at hand in such cases as the provisions scope differ.
52
  
 
A narrow as well as a wider definition of conflict has been proposed. The former was 
confirmed by the Appellate Body, in the Guatemala-Cement case, concerning an internal 
conflict between the rules of Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes for antidumping disputes and the general provisions of the DSU. In this case 
the Appellate Body stated that conflicts between the DSU and these “special or additional 
rules,” shall be interpreted narrowly. Additionally, both should be complied with wherever 
possible.
53
 This reasoning was expressed by the Appellate Body with reference to the 
following; The DSU provides that certain listed provisions of various WTO agreements shall 
prevail over the DSU to the extent that “there is a difference” between them. According to the 
Appellate Body, conflicts between the DSU and these “special or additional rules” are to be 
construed narrowly, and both should be complied with wherever possible.
54
 Article 17.4 of the 
Antidumping Agreement but not Article 17.3 is listed as such a “special or additional 
rule”.”55 Conclusively, the Appellate body found that “the general DSU requirement to state 
with specificity the “measures at issue” as well as “the legal basis of the complaint” must 
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apply along with the provisions of Article 17.4, since both can be complied with 
simultaneously”.56  
According to Jenks a state, which is party to two treaties, must comply with both of them at 
the same time as he promotes a conflict to be at hand when the party do not comply with the 
provisions of the two treaties simultaneously. Moreover, a presumption against conflict can be 
presumed when several agreements are concluded between the same parties. This as a result 
of that the agreements are intended to be consistent with each other.
57
 As Jenks argues no 
conflict is at hand when “it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by 
refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another”.58 If using Jenks’ 
definition of conflicts, a factual conflict would not be faced if a MEA authorizes, and not 
obliges, the usage of trade restrictions, otherwise prohibited by GATT.
59
 Jenks’ definition of 
conflict can be seen as rather strict and technical and a similar definition has also been 
expressed by other promoters.
60
 
 
The wider definition can be supported by an interpretation of articles 8 and 41 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (Vienna Convention), as promoted by among 
others Bartels and the panel in the EC-Bananas III
61
 case. Bartels suggests that a “treaty 
which defeated the object and purpose of the earlier treaty should be seen as conflicting with 
this earlier treaty”.62 The EC-Bananas III case regards a factual conflict, as a provision in an 
agreement permitted what a provision in another agreement explicitly prohibited. As the panel 
only dealt with one agreement it could, therefore without using a wider definition of conflict, 
come to the same conclusion. This could be done by using the rule ““for an effective interpre-
tation” to ensure that the explicit rights, provided for in another part of the WTO Agreement, 
are respected”.63 While a wider definition like Bartels’ covers “possibilities, privileges and 
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rights”, the narrow definition only includes conflicts of obligations. Consequently, the latter 
view “favours the most stringent obligations”.64  
 
A rather wide proposal on the definition of conflict was already proposed in 1932 by 
Rousseau and has later on been promoted by several authors.
65
 Additionally, Sir Humphrey 
Waldock has expressed the term of conflict to include “a comparison between two treaties 
which revealed that their clauses, or some of them, could not reconcile with another”.66 
Another proposal of a wide definition is suggested by Krajewski, who means that a conflict is 
at hand when “MEA and WTO law equally applies and where the implementation of one set of 
rules at least reduces the effective implementation of the other set of rules”.67 Such a wide 
definition involves cases where an effective implementation of a MEA will not be possible 
because of already implemented WTO law. Even a situation where the furtherance of the 
objectives of a MEA is complicated by existing WTO law a conflict may, in accordance with 
this definition, be at hand.
68
   
 
Nevertheless, Marceau argues, with reference to that the main objective of treaty interpreta-
tion is to identify the parties’ intention, that the definition of conflicts is proposed to be 
interpreted narrowly. This should be done to cover as much as possible of the agreement of 
the parties. Moreover, accepting a wider definition may provide a third party, for example an 
interpreter or an adjudication body, with the power to set aside voluntarily negotiated 
provisions that states have agreed upon.
69
 
 
As described by Pauwelyn conflicts can be either “inherent normative” or “necessary/potenti-
al”. The former group constitutes of a breakage “in and of itself” and could be described as 
conflicts depending “solely on the conditions for breach of the particular norm in question”. 
For the latter group a breach is at hand whenever the grating of certain rights or the imposition 
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of certain obligations, “once exercised or complied with”, constitute a breach of the other 
norm. While necessary conflicts include that one norm either will or may lead to a breach of 
the other “whenever either of the two norms is complied with as required”, there is for poten-
tial conflicts a “margin of discretion” and the breach will be materialised only if a right 
actually has been decided to be exercised by a state. The category of conflict involving neces-
sary and potential conflicts can be described as conflicts in applicable law and is by far the 
most common before international tribunals.
70
  
 
Regarding the definition of conflict the WTO agreement does not include any definition. Not 
even article 31.4 of the Vienna Convention stating that “a special meaning should be given to 
a term if it is established that the parties so intended” gives any further assistance as the WTO 
agreement does not confirm any meaning of “conflict”. However, the panel in the EC-
Bananas
71
 ruling defined conflicts as “(i) clashes between obligations contained in GATT 
1994 and obligations contained in agreements listed in Annex 1A, where those obligations are 
mutually exclusive in a sense that a Member cannot comply with both obligations at the same 
time, and (ii) the situation where a rule in one agreement prohibits what a rule in another 
agreement explicitly permits”.72 This definition is broader than the one promoted by Jenks, as 
including conflicts between obligations and rights. Furthermore, the panel in the EC-Bananas 
case stipulated that an obligation or authorization embodied in any of the listed agreements in 
Annex 1A prevails over conflicting obligations provided for by GATT 1994.
73
 On the 
contrary, the panel in the Guatemala-Cement
74
 and Indonesian-Autos
75
 cases adopted a 
stricter definition in line with the ones promoted by Jenks resulting in that the stricter rule 
prevailed.
76
 However, it can be argued that the WTO adjudicating bodies should apply a 
broader definition of conflicts. One reason for such a wider approach is that the strict defini-
tion, including only mutually exclusive obligations, would involve a systematic evaluation of 
the WTO members’ obligations outside the members’ rights. Moreover, the promotion of 
trade liberalization cannot always override the WTO member’s trade restrictive rights. It is 
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rather vital which definition of conflicts that the WTO adjudicating bodies apply as it may 
influence the outcome of a dispute.  
 
3.2 Conflicts of Norms   
Conflicts of different and distinct legal issues may arise between the WTO and MEAs. Firstly; 
there could be conflicts between the rights and obligations contained in two different treaties 
that apply between the same states, who are members of the WTO as well as parties to a 
specific MEA. For example a MEA authorizing the imposition of measures restricting imports 
and exports can be challenged before the WTO system as conflicting with the MFN-principle 
in article I of the GATT, as not fulfilling the requirements for equal treatment of like products 
between the WTO members. Additionally, the principle of national treatment, article III, 
could be infringed where import restrictions in MEAs restrict the use of certain substances in 
products which could be challenged as violations of national treatment due to their PPM-
based distinction of like products. Moreover, any trade affecting measure in form of a ban, 
embargo and prohibition etcetera could be challenged before the WTO as conflicting with the 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions in article XI of the GATT.
77
  
 
Moreover, two parties to a MEA could disagree on how to interpret a specific MEA provision, 
or one party could even challenge an imposed measure, related to a specific part of a MEA 
that it has not signed itself. Additionally, disputes concerning imposed trade measures which 
are affecting non-parties may arise between two WTO members, who are not both parties to 
the relevant MEA. Furthermore, parties to a MEA could use trade measures as to put pressure 
on a non-party to force this country to join, which may violate the WTO principle of non-
discrimination.
78
    
 
Concerning different types of potential conflicts, the most common type are those raised by 
non-members of a MEA concerning trade measures imposed according to these MEAs. This 
as it is more unlikely for a WTO member, which has voluntarily joined the MEA, to later 
challenge the same before the adjudicating bodies of the WTO. Additionally, a country, which 
is a member to the WTO as well as to the MEA, has basically waived their WTO rights in the 
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areas where the MEA applies. Furthermore, the majority of the trade affecting measures 
contained in MEAs are directed at non-parties.
79
 
 
3.3 Conflicts of Jurisdictions 
Conflicts of jurisdictions occur when “two institutions or adjudicating bodies may claim to 
have exclusive or permissive jurisdiction to address the factual or legal aspects of a matter 
having trade and environment dimension”.80 The effectiveness and powerfulness of the WTO 
dispute mechanism may attract disputes concerning conflicts of different kinds. Even disputes 
between WTO members who are not both parties to a specific MEA have been argued to be 
possible to bring before the WTO. This as the MEA’s dispute settlement provisions would not 
be available to non-parties why these would have no other alternative than to bring the dispute 
to the WTO.
81
  
 
If a wide definition of conflict, like the one Krajewski promotes, is applied to the relationship 
between the dispute settlement mechanisms of MEAs and those of the WTO it can be argued 
that a conflict is at hand “where the issue at stake could be subject of both mechanisms and 
when submitting this issue to one mechanism reduces the effectiveness of the other 
mechanism”.82 Jurisdictional conflicts constitute an important matter as such disputes may 
seriously affect the effectiveness of dispute-settling mechanisms. As an example of reasons 
weakening the dispute-settling mechanisms of MEAs, Krajewski mentions the fixed time-
tables included in the WTO system. This feature creates a system that more quickly can 
provide a solution of a dispute, constituting in either a legally binding decision or the 
allowance of the enforcement of unilateral trade measures. This possibility provides the WTO 
system with a higher degree of effectiveness.
83
   
 
Regarding conflicts of jurisdictions between the dispute settlement mechanisms of MEAs and 
those of the WTO a dispute may only be at hand when both of two bodies exercise de facto 
jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction can, as mentioned, be seen as a question of the 
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applicable law. Therefore, simply the dispute-settling mechanisms that make decisions based 
on law, and not non-legal issues, can execute jurisdiction in a legal sense. Concerning the 
meaning of jurisdiction, it is about “the competence of a body to decide an issue”.84 If a body 
makes a decision without legal support it would not be legally valid, and therefore, if 
conflicting, not constitute a jurisdictional conflict. Therefore, the variety of different dispute 
settlement mechanisms in MEAs means that jurisdictional conflicts are seldom at hand. Just 
some organs, such as courts, tribunals and some kinds of arbitration bodies, can exercise 
jurisdiction. For example a conflict may arise between two countries concerning provisions of 
a MEA and the WTO. If it is agreed to negotiate according to the provisions of the MEA and 
one of the parties later on additionally requests for a panel to be established, it is not a 
question of conflict of jurisdictions but, nevertheless, the effects of the “chill” factor 
constitute a risk.
85
 This “chill” factor means a risk for that existing WTO rules will negatively 
affect or even thwart the possibility for new agreements to be concluded, which is seen as a 
rather common implication which has affected for example the Kyoto Protocol.
86
    
 
The mandate of jurisdiction in a specific case is determined by the relevant procedural rules, 
as for example the DSU. A jurisdictional conflict, in the meaning of overlapping jurisdiction, 
is though at hand when a MEA explicitly calls for an international court or tribunal to solve a 
dispute. To give an example of this the Swordfish
87
 dispute can be mentioned. The dispute 
was between Chile and the EU and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as well 
as the WTO exercised jurisdiction. However, the jurisdictional conflict was avoided in this 
case as the parties came to an agreement outside both forums that involved the promotion of 
developing the multilateral framework for the conservation and management of swordfish in 
the South-Eastern Pacific.
88
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4 Common Principles of International Law on Conflicts 
In recent years it has become generally known that the WTO adjudicating bodies consider 
non-WTO law when interpreting the rights and obligations under the WTO covered 
agreements.
89
 Non-WTO law could for example be used when WTO law leaves a question 
unanswered, as to fill gaps within the WTO system. Consequently, procedural rules of inter-
national law could have a decisive influence on the outcome of a WTO dispute.
90
 In the 
following chapter the jurisdiction under DSU and MEAs will be treated as well as which law 
that is to be applicable before the WTO adjudicating bodies. Furthermore, relevant principles 
of international law on which law that should be considered before the WTO and how 
conflicts of both norms and jurisdictions should be solved will be treated.    
 
4.1 Jurisdiction under the DSU 
The WTO dispute settlement system, which has been operational since 1995, is the result of 
fifty years of experience from the settlement of disputes of its predecessor, GATT 1947. 
Therefore, the current DSU has been subject to quite extensive changes in comparison with 
the one existing under the GATT 1947.
91
 The current one includes for example fixed time-
tables and a more structured process. The main objective with the WTO dispute settlement 
system is to promptly settle disputes between its members concerning their respective rights 
and obligations under WTO law, as also expressed in article 3.3 of the DSU. Moreover, the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism is held to provide “security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system”, as stated in article 3.2 of the DSU.92  
 
The WTO system intends to settle disputes through bilateral negotiations between the 
disputing parties and unilateral actions are intended to be avoided. Moreover, any agreed 
solution must be consistent with the WTO rules.
93
 The recommendations as well as rulings of 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) can neither add nor diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements.
94
 Additionally, the WTO members, in form of a comp-
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lainant as well as a respondent, are obliged to bring or accept the jurisdiction of the DSU, as 
long as the covered agreements are concerned. In other words, the DSU is compulsory for its 
members.
95
 To be entitled to initiate dispute settlement proceedings before the WTO there is 
firstly the requirement for a WTO membership, which only governments/states can obtain. 
Furthermore, a benefit accruing to a member, either directly or indirectly under any 
agreements, shall be impaired by measures taken by another member.
96
  
 
4.1.1 Article 1.1 of the DSU 
The jurisdiction of the panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO are regulated in article 1.1 
of the DSU. This provision states that “The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall 
apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultations and dispute settlement provisions of 
the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding”. These agreements are hereinafter 
referred to as the “covered agreements”. Therefore, any WTO member may raise claims 
before the WTO concerning any infringement of the WTO rights and obligations or, in other 
words, where a benefit accruing to a WTO member directly or indirectly under an agreement 
is considered to be either nullified or impaired. In general such an infringement is based on a 
contracting party’s failure of fulfilling their obligations according to the agreement. Such 
claims are most common but it is, however, also possible to settle a dispute concerning non-
violation and “situation” complaints.97   
 
4.1.2 Article 23 of the DSU 
An important provision regarding the relationship between the WTO system and MEAs is 
article 23 of the DSU stating in the first paragraph that “When Members seek the redress of a 
violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered 
agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, 
they shall have resource to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding”. 
From the second paragraph it follows that “In such cases, Members shall: (a) not make a 
determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or 
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, 
except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of 
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this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings 
contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award 
rendered under this Understanding”.  
 
Judging from the wording of article 23 of the DSU it seems, consequentially, as the prior 
accepted obligatory dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO results in that the members 
have given exclusive jurisdiction to address violations of WTO provisions to the adjudicating 
bodies of the WTO. Nevertheless, the opinions on this matter are divided. Conversely, some 
authors suggest that there is an opportunity, though limited, to “escape” the WTO jurisdiction 
through an application of article 25 of the DSU, authorizing the usage of arbitration rules, as 
an alternative mean of settling disputes for WTO members.
98
 Pauwelyn argues that it is hard 
to imagine that the decision of the WTO members to provide the WTO adjudicating bodies 
with exclusive jurisdiction regarding the covered agreements, shall involve that all disputes 
regarding any trade affecting measure between the members have to be solved within the 
WTO dispute-settling system. For example another kind of forum could be desired or found to 
be more suitable to handle the complexity of a disputed issue.
99
 
 
However, a possibility to in parallel with the WTO dispute-settling mechanisms use other 
such mechanisms under other international agreements is, according to Marceau and 
González-Calatayud, possible through the wording of article 11.3 of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). This article states that “Nothing in 
this Agreement shall impair the rights of Members under other international agreements, 
including the right to resort to the good offices or dispute settlement mechanisms of other 
international organizations or established under any international agreement”.100  
 
4.2 Jurisdiction under MEAs 
The majority of MEAs include provisions concerning dispute settlement. Such provisions are 
more or less detailed and are normally optional, and not binding, for the parties. The dispute-
                                                 
98
 Marceau, G and González-Calatayud, A, The Relationship Between the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of 
MEAs and those of the WTO, in Schalatek, L, Trade and Environment, the WTO, and MEAs, Facets of a 
Complex Relationship, page 75. 
99
 Pauwelyn, J, How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on Non-World Trade Organization 
Law?, Questions of Jurisdiction and Merits, page 1005.  
100
 Marceau, G and González-Calatayud, A, The Relationship Between the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of 
MEAs and those of the WTO, in Schalatek, L, Trade and Environment, the WTO, and MEAs, Facets of a 
Complex Relationship, page 75. 
- 28 - 
 
settling mechanisms of these agreements vary greatly in character and can constitute every-
thing from adjudication by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to arbitration or even con-
ciliation, if requested by a party. The jurisdictional mandate of these mechanisms is normally 
limited to the issues covered by the MEA in question. It is common that a step of negotiations 
is followed by intervention of a third party to solve the disputed issue. However, most of these 
mechanisms do not involve any binding resolution of conflicts but some MEAs do at least 
establish that the parties must consider the decisions in good faith. Furthermore, some MEAs 
include non-compliance procedures, which aim at avoiding disputes.
101
    
 
Conclusively, MEAs do not normally contain compulsory dispute-settling mechanisms, bind-
ing dispute resolutions or reference to any exclusive jurisdiction. On the contrary, the WTO 
regime has, as mentioned, exclusive jurisdiction according to article 23 of the DSU on WTO 
related disputes. Another more progressive feature of the WTO regime is the system of quasi-
automatic adoption of the WTO adjudicating bodies’ recommendations by the DSB, meaning 
that these are binding and if not respected, it may result in sanctions. However, situations, 
where the same matter may be subject to jurisdiction under article 23 of the DSU as well as 
some non-compliance or dispute-settling mechanism of a MEA, may arise. With reference to 
the wording of article 23 of the DSU it is not probable that the WTO bodies, unless the disput-
ing parties agree so, would decline jurisdiction with reference to any voluntary mechanism of 
a MEA. Factual conflicts of dispute-forums may because of the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
WTO be hard to find, especially when the objectives and purposes with the dispute-settling 
mechanisms of MEAs and the WTO differ.
102
 
 
Regarding situations of parallel jurisdiction, the WTO adjudicating bodies may be preferred to 
those of MEAs. An expansion of the existing WTO institution could contribute with some 
valuable pros such as an effective dispute settlement system and a way to easier gain 
recognition. However, there is a risk for that the WTO regime including its dispute settlement 
mechanisms would be overburden. Such a development can not seem desirable and maybe an 
extension of the existing WTO would be needed to be able to handle also the issues of MEAs. 
In turn this could lead to a legitimacy crisis and the WTO system’s transparency could get 
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negatively affected.
103
 Additionally, such a development could further weaken the dispute 
settlement of MEAs. Moreover, it can, as mentioned, be argued that the WTO system could 
be said to have a “chill” effect on MEAs’ dispute settlement, like potential conflicts between 
WTO law and trade measures in MEAs has on MEA negotiations.
104
 
 
As states are bound by numerous obligations that apply in a parallel manner and offer parallel 
jurisdiction, it seems possible that situations of parallelism might arise. Parallel jurisdiction is 
at hand even in situations where two treaties provide for their exclusive jurisdiction over a 
specific matter, as long as no international authority exists to access such conflicts. In cases of 
parallel jurisdiction there is a risk for different or inconsistent conclusions on both factual 
aspects and implementation of provisions of a MEA. To date it is unclear how such a situation 
shall be treated. Further implications of parallel jurisdiction may be, even though no factual 
conflict between the dispute settlement of the WTO and MEAs is at hand, tensions regarding 
sequence and timing.
105
  
 
The CTE recommends in its report from 1996 that ”if a dispute arises between WTO 
Members, Parties to an MEA, over the use of trade measures they are applying between them-
selves pursuant to the MEA, they should consider trying to resolve it through the dispute 
settlement mechanisms available under the MEA”.106 Legally this statement can only be seen 
as a recommendation and not as it would amend the mandate according to article 23 of the 
DSU. On the other hand, a violation of a MEA may be at hand if an obligation to use the 
dispute-settling mechanism of that MEA, in event of disagreements, is denied. However, it is 
uncertain if the dispute-settling possibilities within the MEA should be exhausted before the 
mechanisms of the WTO are used by the parties. Practically, no such obligation seems to 
exist, foremost due to the non-compulsory nature of MEAs. Once again, it seems unlikely that 
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the WTO would decline jurisdiction as a result of alternative dispute settlements provided for 
in MEAs.
107
 
 
4.3 Applicable Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings 
The substantive jurisdiction of the adjudicating bodies of the WTO covers claims under the 
WTO covered agreements, including only a number of the WTO agreements. Consequently, 
non-WTO rules as well as WTO rules, not deriving form the WTO treaty itself, do not fall 
within the same jurisdiction. The main source of WTO law is the WTO treaty’s provisions. 
The so called Final Act, concluded in 1994 during the so called Uruguay Round, involves 
around sixty treaties.  Of these treaties the most important ones, among thirty of them, are 
included in the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. One vital feature for the effects 
of a WTO treaty is whether it is listed in Appendix 1 to the DSU or not, as then being a part of 
the covered agreements. If so a treaty can be subject to as well as invoked before the adjudica-
ting bodies of the WTO. Consequently, non-covered treaties cannot be enforced, at least not 
directly, under the DSU.
108
    
 
The covered agreements include apart from the treaty provisions some annexes setting out 
member-specific schedules including so called trade concessions or specific commitments. 
Such concessions are mainly grounded in bilateral agreements but are, due to the MFN-
principle, multilateral in that way that they are verified and accepted by every WTO 
member.
109
 These concessions should be interpreted in the same way as the covered treaty 
provisions.
110
 Both amendments concerning the covered agreements and additions of new 
members can change the coverage of the covered agreements. The same concerns the possi-
bility for conclusions on new agreements and protocols.
111
 
 
4.3.1 Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU 
The foremost purpose of the dispute-settling system of the WTO is described in article 3.2 of 
the DSU stating that “The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in 
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providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members 
recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered 
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings 
of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements”. Especially the last sentence is vital for the discussion concerning which law that 
shall be interpreted by the adjudicating bodies of the WTO and can be understood as an 
important limitation of the scope of applicable law before the WTO, thus, covering only the 
covered agreements. However, the panel in the Korea-Government Procurement uttered that 
article 3.2 does not limit the application of sources of international law through stating that 
“we can see no basis here for an a contrario implication that rules of international law other 
than rules of interpretation do not apply”.112  
 
The DSU does not explicitly state any limitation concerning the scope of international law 
applicable before the WTO. Nonetheless, the last sentence of article 3.2 restricts the applica-
tion of international law in any given case. Article 19.2 of the DSU repeats the content of 
article 3.2 when referring to the panels and the Appellate Body. Apart from limiting a too 
broad interpretation of the covered agreements, article 3.2 also ensures that the provisions of 
the covered agreement shall prevail over other applicable provisions in the event of a 
conflict.
113
 However, international law should be considered as long as it is not incompatible 
with the covered agreements.
114
 Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that the DSU is 
not meant to handle disputes between WTO law and other international law but to limiting the 
powers of the WTO adjudicating bodies. Even though the General Interpretative Note, part of 
Annex 1, handles such disputes also the DSU ensures the primacy of the provisions contained 
in the covered agreements. 
 
Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU have been subject to several WTO disputes. Two examples 
of cases involving a potential conflict between a covered agreement and other international 
law are the EC-Hormones
115
 case and the Guatemala-Antidumping
116
 ruling. The former 
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concerned the principle of precaution, which was said to be a principle of international law 
enabling a prohibition on beef imports. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body let articles 5.1 and 
5.2 of the SPS agreement prevail over this principle. A similar decision was drawn in the 
latter case with reference to article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Practices Agreement, as the panel 
did not decide for an infringement of international law as the source of law was found to be 
illegitimate in WTO context due to a relief for notification delays in article 3.8 of the DSU.
117
  
 
Interestingly, the panel as well as the Appellate Body found in the Argentina-Footwear
118
 
case, regarding a dispute between covered agreements and other international agreements, that 
other international agreements can modify a WTO member’s obligations under a covered 
agreement through stating that instruments not covered by WTO law may have some effect 
within the WTO legal system. However, this can, as Bartels argues, be a questionable 
interpretation as articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU only should be used as to exclude the 
application of these rights and obligations with exception from when giving guidance to the 
scope of the WTO members’ WTO obligations.119    
 
In another interpretation, made by the Appellate Body in the EC-Hormones
120
 ruling, article 
30 of the Vienna Convention was referred to when suggested that articles 3.2 and 19.2 could 
be used instead of superseding the bilateral agreement in question. Along similar lines the EC-
Poultry
121
 case can be questioned as excluding a bilateral agreement as not constituting one of 
the covered agreements. However, it should, as Bartels argues, be stressed out that the 
bilateral agreement, as a non-covered agreement, could not be applied to the disadvantage of 
the rights and obligations contained in a covered agreement.
122
  
 
Conclusively, the presented interpretations show implications. While in some cases interna-
tional law, not covered by the covered agreements, is left without consideration with reference 
to not constituting a covered agreement, non-covered international law is excluded in other 
rulings as a result of an application of the Vienna Convention. Additionally, the limitation to 
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the covered agreements, in articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, has been used by the WTO 
adjudicating bodies as to simply override non-covered international law.
123
 
 
4.3.2 Article 7 of the DSU 
Article 7 of the DSU addresses the question of applicable law before the WTO. In its first 
paragraph it states that the disputed issue shall be examined “in the light of the relevant 
provisions” relating to the covered agreements. Moreover, article 7.2 of the DSU states that 
the standards terms of reference are based on the panel request made by the disputing parties, 
which shall be addressed by the panel.
124
 This obligation includes the application as well as 
the addressing of certain WTO provisions. Concerning the scope of the applicable law, it 
could be argued that this reference should be seen as exhaustive. On the contrary, it can be 
suggested that the reference only mentions the significance of some rules, leaving room for 
also other provisions to be considered. Which view that should be promoted is not commonly 
agreed but the latter view can be preferred with reference to the WTO case law, the wording 
of article 3.2 of the DSU in combination with article 31.3 of the Vienna Convention as well as 
the fact that the WTO agreement constitutes a part of public international law. These 
arguments imply that the WTO bodies exist in a wider context of public international law why 
they cannot limit their scope to solely WTO law but also have to consider non-WTO law. A 
further argument for not limiting the scope of the applicable law before the WTO is that other 
international law exists alongside with the WTO law why no explicit exception in article 7 of 
the DSU is needed as long as WTO law does not deviate from that international law. 
Concerning article 3.2 of the DSU it can, as Pauwelyn argues, be seen as not limiting the 
scope of the applicable law but to only state a rather obvious limitation. It is here important to 
make a distinction between interpretations of WTO rules and examinations of WTO claims in 
the context of other international law.
125
 Accordingly, it was announced, in the Korea-
Government Procurement ruling, that the reference under article 7.1 of the DSU should not 
“exclude reference to the broader rules of customary international in interpreting a claim 
before the Panel”.126  
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To the contrary, some argue that article 7 of the DSU could be interpreted as to limit the scope 
of law that could be applied before the WTO dispute-settling bodies. This view can be 
supported by an assumption that article 7 of the DSU corresponds to article 38 of the ICJ 
Statue.
127
 But the same provision has been used for the promotion of an opposite view why 
doubts concerning the article’s interpretation remains.128 
 
The wording of article 7 does not leave any clear guidance concerning the mentioned 
implications. The article does not explicitly state that the applicable law before the WTO is 
limited to that contained in the covered agreements. Nonetheless, the article states that the 
panels shall examine the disputed matter “in the light of the relevant provisions” in the 
covered agreements. According to Bartels this expression does not involve a limitation of the 
applicable law. A similar approach can be found in article 7.2 and its wording in form of that 
the relevant provisions in any covered or, by the parties of the dispute, cited agreements shall 
be considered. No limitation is expressed why the scope of applicable law can be interpreted 
in a broader manner. The additional possibility for the creation of a panel with non-standards 
reference may be interpreted as to open up for possibilities for the DSB to mandate the panels 
to consider sources of law not included in the covered agreements.
129
 
 
4.3.3 Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
The general rule of interpretation in article 31 of the Vienna Convention states in its first 
paragraph that; a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. Accordingly, the wording of the provision read in its context shall at first be examin-
ed as to find the object and purpose of the provision. If no satisfactory outcome is given, the 
treaty as a whole shall be looked upon, including besides the text, its preamble and annexes, 
“…any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty, any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instru-
ment related to the treaty.”130 Additionally, “(a) any subsequent agreement between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any 
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subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation…(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties…” shall be considered.131 In the US-Shrimp case, the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals are examples of 
MEAs which the Appellate Body applied when interpreting article XX of the GATT. But this 
approach has been criticised. Also in the US-Gasoline case the Appellate Body ruled, with 
reference to the mentioned article 3.2 of the DSU, that it has to consider a wide range of 
norms and principles etcetera of international law when interpreting provisions under the 
WTO. If a MEA provides for dispute-settling mechanisms it would, according to article 31.3 
(c) of the Vienna Convention, constitute a part of the applicable law between the parties, 
necessary when interpreting their WTO obligations.
132
 Finally, a special meaning shall be 
given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
133
 Relevant rules of 
international law may, at least, be considered when interpreting WTO law, according to 
article 31.2 (c). Regarding the scope of the third paragraph, earlier rulings made by the WTO 
adjudicating bodies is not covered within the wording of article 31.3 (b), even when adopted. 
However, adopted panel reports are usually considered when resolving WTO disputes as seen 
as creating legitimate expectations among WTO members and therefore should be considered 
where relevant. Conclusively, panel as well as Appellate Body reports have a vital impact on 
the interpretation of WTO law.
134
  
 
If a further examination is needed article 32 of the Vienna Convention constitutes a ground 
for an interpretative process involving that the text of the treaty’s provisions and its object and 
purpose shall be considered when finding out their meaning. Through an interpretation 
according to article 32 the object and purpose is used as to determine “the terms of the treaty”, 
instead as an independent basis for interpretation.
135
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4.4 Conflicts of Substantive Provisions 
As mentioned, the WTO adjudicating bodies quite commonly refer to and adopt other sources 
of international law than WTO law in their rulings. This regards disputes concerning 
resolutions of conflicting obligations as well as adoptions of rules, when the covered 
agreements do not provide an answer. Where the WTO law leaves questions unanswered the 
adjudicating bodies have adopted rules without any prior establishment of the absence of any 
relevant prohibition. In such cases the Appellate Body has first examined whether a 
prohibition on a specific rule exist before adopting a new rule. It can be argued that the WTO 
adjudicating bodies under such circumstances should be bound by any settled law on the 
matter even though it would not have the status of customary international law.
136
 A similar 
approach has been promoted by the Appellate Body in the Korea-Government Procurement 
ruling where it was stated that customary international law “applies to the extent that the WTO 
agreements do not contract out from it”. As long as “no conflict or inconsistency, or an 
expression in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently” exists, the Appellate Body 
holds for that “the customary rules of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the 
process of treaty formation under the WTO”.137   
 
Regarding the complicated issue on how potential conflicts before the WTO should be treated 
the adjudicating bodies of the WTO have uttered suggestions regarding article 1.2 of the DSU 
as well as the General Interpretative Note of Annex 1A. The General Interpretative Note 
regulates that “In the event of a conflict between a provision of the GATT 1994 and a provi-
sion of another agreement in Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement, the provision of the 
other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict”. Moreover, article 1.2 of the DSU 
states; “To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of this 
Understanding and the special and additional rules and procedures set forth in Appendix 2, 
the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in Appendix 2 shall prevail”. Addi-
tionally, if there is a conflict between special or additional rules and procedures set out in 
different covered agreement the DSB Chairman “…shall be guided by the principle that 
special or additional rules and procedures should be used wherever possible, and the rules 
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and procedures set out in this Understanding should be used to the extent necessary to avoid 
conflict.”138  
 
Additionally, principles of equity to condition the application of expressed treaty rights are 
used before the WTO adjudicating bodies. However, such principles normally are just refer-
red to but not applied. As an example obligations can be claimed to have to be performed in 
good faith according to article 26 of the Vienna Convention. Furthermore, the principle of the 
abuse of rights and the principles of estoppel and acquiescence could be mentioned. These 
constitute principles under which the ability of a disputing party to rely on an expressed treaty 
right is conditioned on the party’s conduct. However, it could be questioned whether the 
application of such principles could contravene articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU. Neverthe-
less, an application of such principles could be defended with that such principles constitute a 
“part of the law necessary to the predictability and security of the multilateral trading system, 
and to maintaining of the balance of rights and obligations for which the parties negotia-
ted”.139  
  
4.5 The General Principle against Conflicting Interpretation 
According to the general principle against conflicting interpretation the rules of the WTO 
should be interpreted as to not conflict with other rules of international law. This principle is 
explained by that it is presumed that every new international norm, as created within the 
context of pre-existing international law, builds upon as well as further develops the already 
existing international law. This principle entails that an explicit language must be found for a 
conflict between a new norm and earlier existing law to be at hand. Moreover, the state 
relying on a conflict of norms has to prove it and where several possible interpretations exist 
the one avoiding conflicts should be chosen.
140
 Treaty interpretation can be used as a way of 
avoiding conflicts and involves the giving of a meaning to the terms of a treaty. This could, as 
described, be done through an application of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.  
 
This view is for instance accepted by Marceau, who means that panels and the Appellate 
Body have such an obligation to avoid conflicts. In many cases, though not in all, a cleverly 
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made interpretation would probably result in that such conflicts could be avoided.
141
 Marceau 
argues that when a MEA is used to base a justification through article XX of GATT, the same 
article should be interpreted and applied as to ensure the avoidance of conflict as well as the 
effectiveness of the relevant MEA. This should be the case as article XX of GATT already 
permits the imposition of some unilateral measures as a way to protect the environment, even 
in the absence of a MEA. Therefore, any other solution would be illogical as it would treat 
parties to a MEA less-favourable than members not party to a MEA.
142
  
 
4.5.1 The Good Faith Principle 
Additionally, the principle of good faith presumes that states negotiate and enforce their 
international obligations in a non-conflicting manner.
143
 Therefore, as a way of avoiding 
conflicts, it will often be of importance to consider MEAs when interpreting article XX of the 
GATT.
144
 If the usage of a MEA dispute settlement mechanism is refused it could constitute a 
violation of the MEA. On the other hand, such a refusal cannot constitute a violation of the 
WTO itself. However, it could be used as an argument when assessing the good faith of a 
party to the WTO dispute. Such an approach has been promoted by the Appellate Body in the 
US-Shrimp case where the US had failed, contrary to Section 609, to undertake “serious 
across-the-board negotiations” and this failure constituted one of the elements used to 
conclude that the US had applied its measures in a discriminatory manner. Consequently, it 
could be argued that the obligation to use consultations before imposing unilateral measures 
has gained recognition as a general principle of law. Furthermore, a negligence to pursue such 
consultations aiming at reaching a cooperation agreement within the MEA is seen as 
“evidence of bad faith”, as well as a “violation of due process”, contrary to article XX. 
However, it is doubtful whether the principle of good faith imposes an obligation for a state 
which is member, to the WTO as well as a MEA, to first use and exhaust provided dispute 
settling mechanisms in the MEA, also in cases of overlapping jurisdiction with the WTO.
145
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4.6 The Usage of Non-WTO Law in WTO Proceedings  
One core provision of international law on the matter of the usage of non-WTO law in WTO 
proceedings is the mentioned limitation for the panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO to 
neither add nor diminish the rights and obligations of members contained in the covered 
agreements, as stated in articles 3.2 and 19.1 of the DSU. While some argue that claims 
before the WTO may only be based in the covered agreements, some promote that also rules 
not explicitly set out in the covered agreements should be considered. The promoters of the 
first limited view mean that such an approach seems natural as the panels and the Appellate 
Body must, in event of a conflict between rights and obligations in the covered agreements 
and other norms, be given priority to the former ones. If this approach is applied to the 
concerns drawn concerning the relationship between the WTO and MEAs the panels and the 
Appellate Body will not be able to consider a MEA where it would add or diminish the rights 
and obligations of the WTO members. Nevertheless, the provisions of a MEA, when relevant 
to the matter at subject, could be considered by the adjudicating bodies of the WTO in a WTO 
dispute without having to be justified in terms of an interpretation of a covered agreement.
146
 
How this can be possible will be examined in the following.   
 
As a consequence of the wording of article 3.2 of the DSU, international law may be used 
when interpreting provisions under the covered agreements. Such interpretations have been 
done in several disputes brought before the WTO.
147
 For example the EC-Bananas ruling 
included an interpretation of a waiver made in the light of the Lóme Convention. As to not 
cause any amendments to the obligations and rights under the covered agreements the Lóme 
Convention was not directly applied but only referred to.
148
   
 
Non-WTO law may, without having to be justified in terms of an interpretation of the covered 
agreements, be considered as evidence of compliance or constitute a part of the applicable law 
before the WTO. Regarding the former possibility, a MEA may be considered when a 
member’s compliance under the covered agreements is examined.149 The latter possibility, 
namely to apply for instance a MEA as a part of the applicable law, could be used as in the 
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line of legal reasoning, even though, the MEA is left without the jurisdiction of the WTO. If 
the answer of a question is depending on the answer of another question, the latter is of 
secondary importance to the chain of reasoning, but is, however, applied as law to the extent 
essential for that reasoning.           
 
4.6.1 Decline in WTO Jurisdiction Based on Non-WTO Law 
The adjudicating bodies of the WTO have, as mentioned, compulsory jurisdiction concerning 
claims under the covered agreements. However, such disputes could be won by the imposition 
of non-WTO law resulting in a decline of WTO jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the WTO dispute-
settling mechanisms have a quite decisive power as they have the mandate to decide the 
question of its own jurisdiction. However, these bodies have also an obligation to examine the 
question of jurisdiction on its own initiative. Jurisdiction is to be declined when the WTO 
jurisdiction is undermined by any other agreement applicable between the disputing parties.
 
As a result of an application of international rules on conflict it can be argued that the WTO 
shall decline jurisdiction in cases where the disputing parties have made an agreement to 
either not bring a claim before the WTO or submit a claim to a specific dispute 
resolving/avoiding mechanism. Even though a decision on declining WTO jurisdiction could 
include considerations taken to for example bilateral agreements, this solely influences the 
scope of the applicable law before the WTO, yet, not expanding the WTO jurisdiction beyond 
WTO claims. Additionally, jurisdiction can be declined if a dispute not solely regards WTO 
issues but instead is intricately linked with non-WTO law, as such claims does not fall within 
the jurisdiction of the WTO.
150
  
 
However, a principle like the one of res judicata is rather unlikely to influence a conflict on 
jurisdictional matters between WTO and MEAs. This as this principle would probably not 
create implications between two different dispute-settling mechanisms, even though, the same 
parties are concerned and the subject matter may be related. This as a result of that the 
applicable law, although containing similar provisions, would differ.
151
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4.6.2 Justification of WTO Violations Based on Non-WTO Law 
In the following situations where non-WTO law may justify a violation of WTO law will be 
treated. Some authors mean that members of the WTO cannot base claims before the WTO on 
non-WTO agreements but that such agreements may be invoked in a dispute between two 
parties to a MEA to defend themselves against a claim of violation of provisions under the 
WTO. This view is controversial and others mean that non-WTO agreements could not even 
be invoked as a defence claim before the WTO dispute-settling mechanism as the panels’ 
jurisdiction is limited to only cover the WTO covered agreements.
152
  
 
Non-WTO law is only applicable where both disputing parties are bound by that non-WTO 
law and it has been invoked by one of them. Such non-WTO law may be argued to be applic-
able before the WTO as constituting a part of the applicable law with reference to the fact that 
the WTO agreement is only a part of public international law why also other treaties must be 
considered. Alternatively, article 31.3 (c) of the Vienna Convention can be used as facilitating 
an interpretation in the context of other relevant rules of international law. Furthermore, the 
non-WTO law has to be legal as well as valid to be applied before the WTO. Conclusively, 
WTO law cannot prohibit what is stated in the non-WTO law as well as the rights and 
obligations of third parties may not be affected. Finally, the relevant WTO law has to be 
prevailed by the non-WTO law justifying an otherwise inconsistent WTO measure. This could 
be done through the application of international principles such as lex specialis or lex 
posterior.
153
 
 
Articles 7.2 and 11 of the DSU regulate how substantive evaluations of WTO claims shall be 
assessed. WTO panels are, according to the former provision, obliged to make an “objective 
assessment of … the applicability of … the relevant covered agreements”. This obligation 
may include that other rules of international law are referred to and applied, which may lead 
to that the relevant WTO rules are not found to be applicable and then no violation of WTO 
law is at hand. Regarding the mentioned article 7.2 of the DSU, it also indicates an obligation 
for the WTO adjudicating bodies to consider other rules of international law when resolving 
WTO claims. Pauwelyn has made a distinction between four types of conflicts where non-
WTO law could be used as to justify a WTO violation. Firstly, defences under non-WTO law 
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could be explicitly incorporated into WTO law, either as made in the SPS and TBT agree-
ments with references to other international rules or as waivers, explicitly allowing exceptions 
for otherwise WTO inconsistent measures with reference to non-WTO law. As other interna-
tional rules are explicitly regulated within WTO law in these agreements, the WTO adjudica-
ting bodies are rather comfortable in applying these rules.
154
 However, it can be added that it 
seems questionable that the application of other international rules shall differ due to if they 
are explicitly referred to in WTO law or not, especially as both situations otherwise would 
constitute WTO violations.
155
  
 
The second category includes measures allegedly violating the WTO treaty but that are 
specifically permitted or imposed according to another treaty’s dispute settlement provisions. 
Pauwelyn means that a justification grounded in non-WTO law could be possible also in such 
disputes. As an example a dispute between the International Labour Organization (ILO) and 
WTO could be mentioned, resulting in that the ILO norm was found to prevail as it is more 
specific and later.
156
  
 
Thirdly, non-WTO law could be used as to justify a WTO violation regarding measures that a 
WTO member must enact pursuant to the provisions of another treaty. If another dispute-
settling mechanism has found a measure to be justified under another treaty such a “ruling” 
could be given effect by the WTO adjudicating bodies. Conclusively, it could be seen as it is 
the disputing parties that have justified the WTO violation based on non-WTO law and not 
the WTO bodies. However, if no such earlier finding exists the matter becomes more comp-
licated. An interpretation of non-WTO law, by the WTO adjudicating bodies, would then be 
necessary to enable a decision whether a measure should be justified with reference to the 
relevant non-WTO law. Regarding this third category, it can be emphasised that measures 
under such other conventions will in most cases be justified also with reference to the general 
exceptions in article XX of the GATT. Yet genuine conflicts may arise in exceptional situa-
tions and then these other international sources of law have to be interpreted as to conclude 
which norms that shall prevail.
157
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The fourth category includes measures, normally WTO inconsistent, that are permitted under 
another treaty where a WTO panel finds that this other treaty is respected/violated. Such cases 
require not only an interpretation of other international law but also a decision on whether 
these other rules are infringed or not. It is then vital to consider the limitation of the WTO 
dispute-settling mechanisms’ jurisdiction, to only involve claims under the covered agree-
ments. With that limitation in mind it can thus be questioned whether the WTO is permitted to 
conclude such decisions. Pauwelyn argues that such a power for the panels should not be 
easily accepted and should depend on the circumstances in every specific case. In such situa-
tions it is rather complicated to uphold the distinction between the questions of jurisdiction 
and the scope of the applicable law before the WTO. Regarding these disputes the acting of 
the WTO adjudicating bodies may depend on whether there exists any compulsory dispute 
mechanism under another treaty and whether the issues are inextricably linked. If so it seems 
rather likely that a panel would suspend its proceeding, giving the disputing parties a chance 
to first obtain a ruling under the other treaty. If no such compulsory mechanism exists there is 
more likely that a panel would decide the issue itself. However, such a solution would include 
a finding of a violation under the other treaty.
158
  
 
In addition, non-WTO law, in form of a MEA, may also be considered in situations where 
measures are applied as to justify the furtherance of an environmental goal of the MEA, when 
deciding on the applicability of article XX of the GATT for the benefit of a particular WTO 
member. However, a MEA cannot constitute a relevant rule applicable to the relation between 
the parties, when both disputants are not parties to the MEA. Nevertheless, such a MEA may 
be used as part of a factual analysis of the circumstances of a dispute and be the reason why a 
member adopted that particular trade measure and applied it in that manner.
159
  
 
Some cases may take the panel outside its limited jurisdiction. If a defense is based on non-
WTO law the panel may decide either that the defense shall be disregarded as a violation of 
the WTO treaty is at hand or to decline jurisdiction as the dispute concerns claims under 
another treaty, which are inextricably linked with the WTO claims but does not solely concern 
WTO claims. As a consequence, the panel could reject the WTO complaint which seems to be 
a preferred solution as long as the dispute concerns a rather serious defense under non-WTO 
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law. Such an approach encourages the disputing parties to resolve matters of non-WTO law 
amicably. Moreover, conflicting rulings are avoided and a fragmentation of international 
regimes counteracted. However, the parties could still return to the WTO for a resolution of 
the remaining disputed issues after the matters of non-WTO law have been resolved outside 
the WTO system.
160
 
 
Finally, it is vital to bear in mind that a consideration of a defence under non-WTO law is not 
synonymous with an acceptance of such a defence. Still the dispute-settling mechanisms may 
find that the other international law does neither require nor permit the challenged measures. 
Moreover, a conflict could also be resolved in favour of WTO law. Even if the other source of 
international law would prevail it would just result in that no violation under the WTO could 
be concluded.
161
   
 
Additionally, it could be stated regarding the application of non-WTO law that the WTO 
adjudicating bodies have two alternatives; either to ignore non-WTO law or to consider it 
with risk for misinterpretation or weakening the other treaty. However, the latter alternative 
seems to be the best, especially as those risks can be attended quite easily. Advice from non-
WTO expertise as well as additional expertise within the WTO could help to minimize or 
even prevent such implications.
162
 Furthermore, article 13 of the DSU, authorizing the WTO 
adjudicating bodies to search for information, irrespectively from where, could be applied as 
to use evidence and facts, presented under MEAs, before the WTO.
163
    
 
4.7 Irreconcilable Conflicts  
When a conflict is irreconcilable a specific rule under the WTO may be superseded by a rule 
of a MEA. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention is relevant when deciding which of the norms 
that shall prevail in the event of a conflict. According to this article, specific provisions in 
treaties governing conflicts with other treaties must be respected. Moreover, a treaty later in 
time shall prevail over an older one on the same subject matter. A principle not covered by the 
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Vienna Convention but although seen as a principle of international law is the principle of lex 
specialis. This principle means that when the same subject matter is dealt with in several 
provisions the specific one shall prevail over the general.  
 
In the majority of conflict situations between the WTO agreements and MEAs the WTO has 
to give way because of its reciprocal nature. As many MEAs constitute norms of integral type, 
while most WTO provisions constitute norms of reciprocal type, the WTO provisions, when 
later in time, can be seen as modifying earlier obligations contained in MEAs. Such an 
approach results in, when conflicting with the MEA, to affect WTO members as well as non-
members and third parties. The conflicting WTO provision could then be seen as illegal 
regarding the disputed issue with reference to articles 41 and 58 of the Vienna Convention, as 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the MEA. Consequently, the MEA would prevail 
in such a conflict despite the fact that the WTO provision is later in time. In situations where 
the MEA instead is later in time, it can be argued that provisions of MEAs, are easily accepted 
to modify agreements as the WTO agreement because of its reciprocal nature, with reference 
to articles 41 and 58 of the Vienna Convention. The MEA could then prevail as lex posterior 
according to article 30.4 of the Vienna Convention. However, the WTO provision is not seen 
as illegal in such cases seen, but has only as the earlier provision to give way to the later 
created MEA. Conclusively, the MEA shall as a consequence of its integral nature prevail 
between two parties bound by both relevant norms, either with reference to articles 41 and 58 
of the Vienna Convention or article 30.4 of the Vienna Convention.
164
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5 Case-Studies   
5.1 CITES 
5.1.1 General Description 
CITES, entered into force in 1975, and constitutes, with its 175 parties, the conservation 
agreement with most members. It includes varying degrees of protection to more than 30,000 
species of animals and plants, irrespectively of traded as live specimens, fur coats or other 
products. The international trade in such products amounts annually to approximately billions 
of dollars. Around hundreds of millions of plant and animal specimens are estimated to be 
affected and for some of these the trade together with other factors such as habitat loss can 
even lead to their extinction. However, numerous wildlife species in trade are not endangered, 
but even though protected through CITES as enabling to safeguard these resources for the 
future.
165
 
 
Moreover, CITES aims foremost at ensuring “the international co-operation of Parties to 
prevent international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants from threatening their 
survival”.166 Furthermore, CITES could be said to enforce secondary objectives as to 
encourage non-parties to join the convention, to maintain species’ role in their ecosystem and 
to monitor trade.
167
  
 
5.1.2 Trade Affecting Measures 
If the rules of the WTO would be directly and solely applied to the provisions of CITES the 
most of these MEA provisions would probably be found violating WTO law. The risk for 
conflicts may be explained by the differences in objectives of the agreements, which 
obviously complicates a simultaneous promotion of the agreements. While the WTO aims at 
promoting free trade, CITES aims at protecting species from overexploitation due to trade. 
Additionally, CITES measures, on the contrary to GATT measures, are not simply grounded 
in consideration of characteristics of a “product”. Furthermore, the measures included in 
CITES require to be discriminating as the solely possible solution otherwise would be to 
impose a global prohibition on trade even in situations where only an isolated population is in 
need of protection.   
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The Secretariat of CITES adopts a strategic plan every fifth year as to try to enhance for a 
mutual supportiveness with the WTO. This plan aims at establishing continuing recognition 
and acceptance of CITES measures by the WTO and at ensuring the mutual supportiveness of 
the decision-making process between CITES and the WTO.
168
 Furthermore, article XIV (2) of 
CITES states that: “the provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the 
provisions of any domestic measures or the obligations of Parties deriving from any treaty, 
convention, or international agreement relating to other aspects of trade, taking, possession 
or transport of specimens which is in force or subsequently may enter into force for any Party 
including any measure pertaining to the customs, public health, veterinary or plant 
quarantine fields”. Consequently, CITES shall not affect either national or international 
legislations regarding other aspects than the protection of species of trade etcetera.
169
 
Nevertheless, factual conflicts between the WTO and CITES may arise concerning aspects of 
the protection of species. In the following some examples of such conflicts will be studied.   
  
5.1.2.1 Measures Directly Affecting Trade  
CITES invokes trade restrictions against parties and non-parties to protect listed species of 
animals and plants threatened with extinction and endangerment.
170
 The species that are 
regulated in CITES are listed in three appendices to the agreement and trade is permitted to 
different extents depending on in which of the three appendices particular species are listed. 
Articles III, IV, V and VI of CITES regulate import and export permits and re-exports 
certificates. Additionally, article VIII.1 of CITES states that its members individually shall 
impose “appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of the present Convention”. 
Furthermore, article XIV provides that the parties are not limited by the Convention to adopt 
stricter measures. In such situations the measure is taken pursuant to CITES, although not 
explicitly required.
171
  
 
The trade affecting provisions contained in CITES, are designed to severely constrict the 
market demand for the involved products, through demanding trade restrictions, thus, 
reducing the international market demand for these products.
172
 To give an example CITES 
allows the usage of quotas to regulate leopard trade. However, such quantitative restrictions 
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may, even though conflicting with the wording of article XI.1 of the GATT, increase trade in 
the targeted product as some countries otherwise may prohibit all trade in the targeted 
product.
173
  
 
5.1.2.2 Permit and Listing System 
CITES utilizes a permit and listing system to facilitate prohibitions on imports or exports of 
listed wildlife and wildlife products, except if scientific finding is made showing that the trade 
in question will not threaten the existence of the species.
174
 Consequently, there is a possi-
bility to circumvent a prohibition on trade in specific species trough the obtainment of a 
licence authorizing imports, exports and re-exports as well as introductions from the sea of the 
listed species.
175
 Through this license system trade in some species is aimed to be allowed to 
an extent not reducing the chances of their survival.
176
  
 
5.1.2.3 Humane Transport Regulations 
If humane transport regulations violate the WTO and have been justified according to article 
XX the regulations also must be consistent with the TBT agreement.
177 
If the trade measure 
constitutes a national technical regulation to protect animal or plant life or health the measure 
must also meet the MFN-principle and the national treatment requirements.
178
 Where a party 
applies a measure pursuant to CITES it can be suggested that a rebuttable presumption exists 
including that CITES measures, as included under a convention of international standards, do 
not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade.
179
 However, it is not commonly 
accepted that such an approach should be used.
180
 Additionally, the humane transport 
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standards might not be the least trade restrictive as trade that does not meet these standards 
must be prohibited. 
 
5.1.2.4 Measures Applied at Non-parties 
CITES also contains measures directed at non-parties. Regarding such measures, 
inconsistencies may arise in situations where a WTO member, when implementing the MEA 
obligations, may find itself unable to respect certain obligations to such non-parties. The same 
regards amendments, which only one party has accepted.
181
  
 
Moreover, CITES aims at encouraging participation in itself through allowing trade in listed 
species with non-parties under condition that a non-party provides documentation conforming 
to the provisions of the agreement.
182
 In addition, CITES has enabled numerous trade 
measures of enforcing nature to be imposed on non-parties as well as non-complying 
parties.
183
 What concerns measures applied to implement CITES, articles I and XIII of the 
GATT could be violated. As an example the same treatment has to be applied to every “like” 
product if measures according to article XIII of the GATT shall be allowed.  
 
The documentation required of non-parties is accepted only where information about the non-
party’s competent authorities and scientific institutions are provided to the Secretariat. 
Additionally, trade with non-parties in Appendix I specimens are allowed only in special 
cases and only after consultation with the Secretariat. On the contrary, parties are not 
burdened with such demands. Trade restrictions on non-parties constitute prima facie 
quantitative restrictions which also might violate the MFN and national treatment principles. 
However, discrimination of non-parties regarding trade in otherwise like products might be 
allowed. The panel in the Auto Taxes
184
 case stated that Article III does not prohibit valid 
government policy options where based on products and not taken as to afford domestic 
production protection.
185
 Consequently, CITES policies, not based in protectionism 
considerations, might be allowed even where the measures differ with reference to whether a 
country is party or not.  
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5.1.3 Jurisdiction under CITES 
Concerning the jurisdiction under CITES, the Convention states in its article XVIII regarding 
resolution of disputes that “Any dispute which may arise between two or more Parties with 
respect to the interpretation or application of the provisions of the present Convention shall 
be subject to negotiation between the Parties involved in the dispute”. Consequently, the first 
step should be to find a solution through negotiations between the disputing parties. Further-
more, it is regulated in the second paragraph that if a solution according to the first paragraph 
is not found “the Parties may, by mutual consent, submit the dispute to arbitration, in 
particular that of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and the Parties 
submitting the dispute shall be bound by the arbitral decision”. Hence, if negotiations fail, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague should try to settle the dispute under condition 
that the parties agree to let that forum settle their dispute. Subsequently, CITES does not 
establish any compulsory dispute settling mechanism.  
 
As the CTE suggests that WTO members, also members of the MEA, should consider trying 
to resolve disputes regarding the use of trade measures applied pursuant to the MEA between 
themselves through the dispute-settling mechanism available under the MEA, it implies that 
the disputing countries, where both are WTO members as well as parties to CITES, even 
though, shall try to resolve it according to the mentioned CITES provisions regarding dispute 
resolution. However, the compulsory jurisdiction under the WTO may give rise to tensions.   
 
5.2 The Kyoto Protocol    
5.2.1 General Description 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 after negotiations between 160 countries aiming at 
binding limitations on greenhouse gases for the developed nations, in accordance with the 
objectives of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992. The Kyoto 
Protocol came into force in 2005 after it had been ratified by more than 55 per cent of the 
parties of the UNFCCC and includes binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions for 37 industrialized countries and the European community. These targets amount 
to an average of five percent against 1990 levels over the five-year period between 2008 and 
2012.
186
 However, the responsibility commitments differ. The developed countries have taken 
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a bigger responsibility as responsible for the current high levels of greenhouse gas emissions 
in the atmosphere due to their participation during 150 years of industrialism.
187
 
   
The tradable units covered by the Protocol are created by an act of international law putting 
obligations upon the Protocols’ member parties why the obligations included in the Protocol 
only relate to governments. Furthermore, the “Protocol has not created or bestowed any right 
title or entitlement to emissions of any kind on Parties included in Annex I”.188 Moreover, the 
protocol can be said to only create “the right to a limited pollution in a defined time frame”.189 
As the Protocol implies other entities than its parties to participate in the Kyoto mechanisms 
there is a need for the creation of such rights through rules on implementation or single 
government acts.
190
     
 
5.2.2 Trade Affecting Measures   
The Kyoto Protocol does not contain any measures directly affecting trade. However, 
potential conflicts may arise between the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO. While the parties to 
the Protocol should “strive to implement policies and measures …in such a way as to 
minimize adverse effects…on international trade”, the WTO regime recognizes the import-
ance of to “protect and preserve the environment”.191 As both treaties support some mutual 
interests, some measures imposed with reference to the Kyoto Protocol may be consistent also 
with the objectives of the WTO and other multilateral trading agreements.
192
 In the following 
some examples of potential conflicts that may arise between the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO 
will be examined.   
 
5.2.2.1 Flexible Mechanisms 
The parties to the Kyoto Protocol must meet their targets primarily through national measures 
but the Protocol includes three flexibility mechanisms that may be imposed by the parties to 
the Protocol as to meet their commitments under the Protocol. The first mechanism, referred 
to in article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, Joint Implementation (JI) allows Annex B parties, 
namely the parties with an emissions reduction or limitation commitment under the Protocol, 
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to earn emission reduction units from emission-reductions or emission removal projects in 
other Annex B parties. Such earned units can be used by the parties to meet their Kyoto 
targets. The second mechanism, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), regulated in article 
12 of the Protocol, allows the Annex B parties to implement emission-reduction projects in 
developing countries as a way to earn saleable Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits. 
Also these credits can be counted towards meeting a party’s Kyoto targets. The third 
mechanism, “emissions trading” is treated in article 17 of the Protocol and involves the 
allowance of countries that have emission units, not used but permitted them, to sell this 
excess capacity to countries exceeding their targets. However, each party has to hold a 
minimum level of these units. Moreover, governments may set emissions obligations to be 
reached by participating entities through so called emissions trading schemes, establishing 
climate policy instruments at a national as well as a regional level.
193
   
 
Only parties to the Kyoto Protocol are able to participate in the Kyoto mechanisms. Conseq-
uently, non-parties are excluded from the markets in emissions trading and the certified 
emissions reductions at least to the extent that concerns the earning of credits for greenhouse 
gas emissions. Where two WTO members trade in emission permits, exclusivity may violate 
the MFN-principle in article I of the GATT. However, it is doubtful whether these permits 
and licenses should be classified as either goods or services as a consequence of the elements 
of government regulatory activity. The opinions differ and some argue that conflicts may arise 
between the Kyoto Protocol and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
194
 This 
concerns for example the application of the CDM criteria, to determine whether credits can be 
obtained under the Protocol. These criteria may be regarded burdensome and as neither 
transparent nor generally incompatible with the GATS requirements. However, the scope of 
the GATS is limited but at least some Kyoto mechanism aspects, for example brokerage of 
consulting services, could entail “service or service-related functions” and thus be covered by 
the GATS.
195
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5.2.2.2 Justification of WTO Violations with Reference to the Kyoto Protocol  
Even though the Kyoto Protocol does not explicitly provide for any trade-affecting rules, the 
parties to the Protocol may refer to the Protocol when imposing trade-affecting measures as to 
fulfil their commitments under it.
196
 For instance it is stated in article 2.1 (a) of the Protocol 
that each Annex I party, involving essentially industrialised countries, shall “implement 
and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national circum-
stances”. For this purpose a wide range of potential areas for action, such as energy 
efficiency, renewable energy sources, removal of market distortions such as subsidies and 
transport, are listed. At least some of these measures will affect trade as for example energy 
taxes that will probably affect numerous of products’ prices and competiveness. Conseq-
uently, there is a risk for that parties, despite that no further details are stated, may claim 
justification of WTO violations from the Kyoto Protocol. This could result in the imposition 
of measures restraining greenhouse gas emissions from the claiming parties own territories 
through methods protecting their own industries at expense of importers.
197
  
 
It is rather likely that conflicts arise where a country adopt, as part of its climate change 
policy, tariffs or other measures discriminating against producers in some trading partners, 
either in favour of other trading partners then potentially violating the MFN-principle or in 
favour of “like products” from domestic producers thus potentially violating the national 
treatment principle. Consequently, a potential claim brought before the WTO would be about 
whether the questioned measure should be justified under Article XX of the GATT or in case 
of services under article XIV of the GATS.
198
 It is not commonly agreed upon whether 
“emissions trading” is at all covered by WTO rules. Marketable rights created via an 
emissions trading regime are unlikely to be covered by either the GATT or the GATS, not 
constituting either “goods” or “services”.199 Moreover, trade in rights created by a govern-
ment has until now not been argued to fall within the ambit of the WTO, as also regard 
license, patent, currency etcetera. However, “emission trading” may be argued to fall within 
article XVIII of the GATS, as regulating the possibility for governments to make commit-
ments on government-created rights.  
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Even if “emission trading” should be argued to fall outside the scope of the WTO there might 
still be a possibility for indirect WTO violations where a government is involved in the emis-
sion trading system and the flow of trade in goods and services is affected.
200
 Consequently, 
article III of the GATT could be violated where the competition between imported and 
domestic products are disturbed. Additionally, an infringement under article I of the GATT 
could be at hand if products from parties to the Protocol would be easier to import than 
product from non-parties. Regarding both of the mentioned situations a justification according 
to article XX of the GATT may be claimed. 
 
As an example so called border tax adjustments could be used as to adjust border taxes for 
countries that impose high taxes on a national level. Article II.2 (a) of the GATT permits 
border tax adjustments on articles from which the imported product has been manufactured in 
whole or in part, which by a WTO panel has been interpreted as to be understood as covering 
taxes on inputs used as material in the manufacture or production of the imported product.
201
 
Such border tax adjustments may, if explicitly discriminating against non-members’ exports, 
be seen as a punishment thus encouraging non-parties to join in the future. However, the 
acceptance of border tax adjustments will depend on whether the discrimination is explicitly 
against non-members of the Protocol and on the product in question.
202
 Such adjustments may 
be unwanted as they assess domestic producers, facing imports and not paying such tax, to 
compete with similar untaxed goods on the international market. Furthermore, there is a risk 
for that such schemes are found to be inconsistent with the GATT as indirectly directed at the 
production method instead of at the particular product itself.
203
 It is debated whether such 
border measures when discriminating in nature should be justified by GATT article XX 
and/or GATS article XIV. Such conflicts are probable to arise and the distinction between 
products and production methods will greatly influence the acceptance of such measures.
204
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5.2.2.3 To Put Pressure on Non-parties   
It is suggested that the Kyoto Protocol could be used as to put pressure on countries not party 
to the Protocol.
205
 However, the Kyoto Protocol does not involve trade sanctions against non-
participating countries. Furthermore, it is not commonly agreed upon whether trade measures 
imposed on non-parties, with reference to a MEA, imposes obligations to non-parties or 
whether such measures just condition access to domestic markets on compliance with those 
obligations. As subsequent instruments as well as annexes, amendments and protocols to the 
original MEAs are added gradually, potential conflicts may arise where parties to a MEA may 
not be parties to future instruments. Consequently, non-parties may be engaged to withhold 
their non-party status and memberships of MEAs would not be further engaged. Additionally, 
non-parties may gain advantages from either free-riding without bearing any of the costs or 
subsidising environmentally unsustainable activity defeating the objectives of MEAs. 
Greenpeace has proposed that the US refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol should make it  
possible for WTO members who support the Protocol to base a claim that can be brought 
before a WTO panel. This as a consequence of that the US position on the Protocol is argued 
to be equivalent to a hidden subsidy for its domestic industry and thereby inconsistent with 
WTO rules.
206
 
 
The Protocol is argued to could have been more effective if triggering trade sanctions as 
means of encouraging participation or enforcing compliance and even such measures could be 
found to be in accordance with the WTO. This seems as a rather serious shortcoming of the 
Protocol since some of the largest and fastest-growing emitters are not members. Nevertheless, 
there is a risk for that potential conflicts may arise. The WTO rule on non-discrimination 
could for example be violated where a WTO member seeks to impose border tax adjustments 
to offset the effects of specific domestic greenhouse gas taxes on the competitiveness of its 
own industry against foreigners.
207
   
 
Additionally, a development including that carbon-intensive industries aimed to be targeted 
by the Kyoto Protocol are relocated to non-member countries may undermine the foremost 
aim with the Protocol. It is commonly known that the WTO regime may enable for a WTO 
member to target export products for environmental purposes but to target products because 
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of the way they are made is still uncertain. However, the Shrimp-Turtle ruling may, as 
mentioned, have opened up for such a development. Consequently, in situations where PPMs 
create global externalities, such as greenhouse gases, as to discourage leakage of emissions to 
non-members, the WTO could recognize the legitimacy of such vital goals to the Kyoto 
Protocol.
208
  
 
Even though some favour that trade sanctions should be used against non-joiners as a 
mechanism to encourage participation as allowed under the WTO, there is a resistance to 
solve the free-rider problem in MEAs, arguing that even multilateral sanctions against non-
parties would violate the WTO. It is argued that the free-rider problems could be solved 
through an imposition of off-setting border measures. The Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer has been mentioned as a successful example but at the same 
time it is stated that the possibilities to do the same with another MEA are rather restricted. 
However, CDM projects have been proposed as a way of tackling the free rider problem. To 
achieve this effect emission reductions should only be certified where their technical terms of 
production are manufactured in countries that have ratified the Protocol.
209
   
 
Not even any specific mechanism enforcing compliance of members is included in the Kyoto 
Protocol which could weaken members’ will to adhere honestly to their targets grounded in a 
fear of losing competitiveness to free-riders. Trade sanctions could constitute compliance-
enforcing mechanism but once again WTO violations may then occur. Additionally, it seems 
rather unlikely that such sanctions will be added to the Kyoto Protocol. Instead emission gaps 
will probably be filled with such as generously accounted interpretations of JI and CDM 
projects. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Kyoto parties would respond with aggressive 
sanctions, particularly with regards to that non-members, such as the US, “are getting off scot 
free”.210  
 
5.2.2.4 Subsidies 
Moreover, potential conflicts may arise between the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), which entered into force in 1995. The 
agreement covers only the goods sector and non-specific, but not specific, subsidies are 
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allowed as the specific ones assume to be discriminatory and distorting in nature. This could 
be the case when parties to the Kyoto Protocol “exempt particular favored industries from an 
energy tax, or give out domestic emission permits in a non-neutral way, or reward their 
companies with credits for CDM and JI projects”.211 This as a consequence of that permits 
and credits could be virtually equivalent to money.
212
 Moreover, a WTO panel stated in the 
Lumber case that a financial contribution, thus constituting a subsidy, is not limited to a 
money-transferring action why the giveaway of a valuable emission right by a government 
was found to constitute a subsidy. However, the lumber precedent should be separated from a 
greenhouse gas emission as lumber constitute a good while an emission does not.
213
 However, 
it has been proposed that the initial allocation of permits will fall under the SCM agreement. 
The allocation process’ design and not the character of a subsidy would be of interest when 
deciding whether it would fall within scope of the GATS. Furthermore, GATS might involve 
services employed in the development and management of clean development mechanism 
projects and the financial services related to trade in certified emissions reductions.
214
   
 
Nevertheless, restrictions on subsidies concerning payments under environmental programs 
are allowed in the area of agriculture why subsidies on agriculture projects could be argued to 
be permitted also under the WTO.
215
 However, some argue that some sectors such as ethanol 
subsidies should not be permitted if not scientifically found to be environmentally 
beneficial.
216
 
 
If a subsidy shall qualify to be inconsistent with the GATT some requirements shall be met. 
Firstly, a particular industry or sector has to be granted specifically. Secondly, the subsidy has 
to be linked to exports of the subsided good, conditional on the use of domestic inputs or 
found to cause adverse effects to foreign competitors meaning that the market share of a 
competing producer shall be impaired. However, some subsidies to facilitate domestic 
industry to adjust to its Kyoto commitments are in line with the GATT, where constituting a 
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one-time cost of firms adjusting to new environmental regulations and where the subsidy does 
not exceed 20 % of the costs incurred.
217
    
 
Regarding border tax adjustments it is important to separate those on exports from those on 
imports. While border tax adjustments on imports fall under the GATT, those on exports fall 
under the SCM agreement. In general, border tax adjustments on exports are allowed with 
respect to taxes on consumption under the SCM agreement, although the design of climate 
taxes and accompanying border tax adjustments should be considered. However, such 
adjustments may not be allowed under the agreement when directed at inputs not physically 
present in the final product.
218
 
 
5.2.2.5 TBT Agreement 
Additionally, potential conflicts may arise between the Kyoto Protocol and the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The TBT agreement allows non-discriminatory labelling 
of products. In other words, labels describing characteristics of a good should be allowed 
where equally applied to domestic as well as imported samples of the relevant product. For 
example labelling requirements concerning for example energy efficiency could be accepted. 
However, compulsory labelling requirements concerning the production process may 
constitute a potential conflict. To give an example such conflicts could be argued to arise 
where labels specifying greenhouse gas content in the production process are required.
219
 
However, it is not commonly agreed upon how the TBT agreement would apply to such 
situations. Unrelated processes, such as the last mentioned, could be argued to fall outside the 
scope of the TBT agreement as limited to product characteristics regulations and standards 
and their related processes.
220
 Conclusively, labelling requirements concerning specification 
of the level of greenhouse gas emitted in the production process would almost certainly be 
prohibited by WTO law.
221
 As long as labelling requirements remain voluntary they fall 
outside the scope of article III of the GATT. Additionally, also mandatory labelling require-
ments may not violate the national treatment principle, if the difference in treatment between 
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products with reference to environmental characteristics does not discriminate against 
imported “like” products.222     
 
However, energy efficiency standards, which are developed and applied in a transparent, 
cooperative and non-discriminatory manner, might probably be found compatible with the 
national treatment principle as well as the exceptions under article XX of the GATT, where a 
clear link can be established between a measure and the pursuit of climate policy objec-
tives.
223
 Nonetheless, there may be a violation of the TBT agreement, for example regarding 
that any national standards have to be based on widely accepted international standards.
224
 
However, the various requirements of the TBT agreement will most certainly have a 
constraining effect for the application and design of eco-labels. Once again, a government 
requiring a specification of the level of greenhouse gas emitted in the production process is 
suggested to be prohibited by WTO law.
225
 
 
These issues have been treated in a case where fuel efficiency standards for motor vehicles 
were proposed and later also notified to be introduced by the Japanese government as to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions as to meet their Kyoto targets. A claim was brought before 
the WTO by the EU based on that these standards would discriminate against imports of the 
generally large European cars in favour of the generally small domestically made Japanese 
models.
226
 It has been indicated that fuel efficiency standards are not likely to raise WTO 
concerns when crafted in a manner not discriminating against imported products. Neverthe-
less, the panel in the US-Taxes on Automobiles case stated that a regulation discriminating 
between imported and domestic vehicles was acceptable.
227
 On the contrary, an explicit provi-
sion for separate calculations for imported and domestic fleet averages was not found accep-
table where clearly based on a foreign-domestic distinction.
228
 Conclusively, efficiency stand-
ards are certainly not inherently problematic in relationship to WTO rules, including those in 
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the TBT agreement, even if they apply to imports and reduce import sales. However, a 
consideration has to be made on a case-by-case basis.
229
   
 
5.2.2.6 Government Procurement 
Another discussed issue on potential conflicts is whether government mitigation policies 
violate WTO law. Government procurement is not covered by the GATT, but under the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP), which contrary to the GATT is argued to 
allow discrimination grounded in PPMs that does not constitute unnecessary barriers to 
trade.
230
 It has been argued that procurement programmes which consider “the direct energy 
performance of procured products or services are well within the scope of technical 
specifications allowed under the AGP”.231 Nevertheless, problems may arise concerning such 
programmes referring to the non-product related climate change impacts of products and 
services.
232
 Additionally, the national treatment principle could be infringed where for 
example a government would treat electricity generated from hydropower differently than 
electricity generated from coal-fired power.
233
 This would especially be relevant where the 
former is local and the latter foreign. However, the AGP is a plurilateral agreement why only 
a limited number of the WTO members are parties to the agreement. Therefore, potential 
conflicts with the AGP do not constitute the conflict category requiring the foremost atten-
tion.
234
  
 
5.2.3 Jurisdiction under the Kyoto Protocol 
It is not commonly agreed upon which dispute-settling mechanism conflicts between the 
WTO and the Kyoto Protocol should be brought before.
235
 In contrast to the WTO the Kyoto 
Protocol does not establish any compulsory dispute-settling mechanism. However, the 
Protocol in article 19 states that the provisions of article 14 of the UNFCCC on settlement of 
disputes shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Protocol. Article 14 of the UNFCCC states in its 
first paragraph that; “In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning 
the interpretation or application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a 
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settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own 
choice”. Additionally, its second paragraph regulates that; “When ratifying, accepting, 
approving or acceding to the Convention, or at any time thereafter, a Party which is not a 
regional economic integration organization may declare in a written instrument submitted to 
the Depositary that, in respect of any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Convention, it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in 
relation to any Party accepting the same obligation: (a) Submission of the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice; and/or (b) Arbitration in accordance with procedures to be 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties as soon as practicable, in an annex on arbitration”. 
Additionally, articles 14.5-14.8 of the UNFCCC regulate compulsory conciliation of a dispute 
between parties after one year from that a notification of the dispute by one of the parties has 
elapsed. Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol provides for the establishment of expert review teams 
reporting to the Conference of the parties and which are coordinated by the Secretariat. 
According to article 8.3 of the Kyoto Protocol the reviews provided by these teams “shall 
provide a thorough and comprehensive technical assessment of all aspects of the implementa-
tion by a Party of this Protocol”. Additionally, the Protocol in article 8 establishes a non-
compliance procedure, including an evaluation of listed non-compliance factors on a case-by-
case basis.    
 
Conclusively, the UNFCCC provides for dispute resolution in form of standard international 
settlement provisions as well as possibilities to develop additional mechanisms. Concerning 
the reference to the ICJ, it is only a voluntary dispute settling possibility and only states may 
bring claims before it. However, the ICJ may provide with necessary uniformity but its time 
frames as well as its expertise may seem insufficient. Moreover, parties not suffering from a 
direct injury may have difficulties in showing an injury in cases regarding non-compliance. 
On the contrary, a dispute resolution through arbitration or conciliation may seem more 
appropriate, contributing with valuable pros such as flexibility, speed and better possibilities 
of choosing judges. However, these forums only provide with a resolution that binds only the 
disputing parties. Additionally, the lack of creating uniformity is negative.
236
 Arbitration has 
been suggested to be the best solution for how conflicts between the Kyoto Protocol and the 
WTO should be solved. This could be true as such conflicts regard complex matters and 
require knowledge in complicated environmental issues as well as concerning the Kyoto 
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Protocol and its regulated mechanisms, which an arbitration process could provide with.
237
 
Additionally, both the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC allow flexibility regarding dispute 
settling mechanisms and as their relationship to each other is not decided it is uncertain how 
these disputes shall be settled.
238
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6 Approaches for the Future  
6.1 Proposals Regarding How to Clarify the WTO-MEA Relationship  
 A discussion concerning how the relationship between the WTO and MEAs should be 
clarified has evolved with different views. By a Ministerial Decision at the Uruguay Round 
the CTE was established as to identify the relationship between trade and environmental 
measures, to promote sustainable development as well as to make recommendations on 
whether any modifications of WTO provisions are required in any of the pillars: goods, 
services and intellectual property rights.
239
 Regarding the future development, the CTE has 
recommended that the WTO Secretariat also in the future should cooperate with the MEAs’ 
secretariats and provide the WTO members with information on trade-related developments in 
MEAs. Moreover, several proposals on how to clarify the relationship between trade 
restrictive MEAs and the agreements under the WTO have been put forward to the CTE. 
There has been a desire for a legal clarification of the relationship between the WTO and 
MEAs as well as for a stronger dispute settlement mechanism within the MEAs.
240
 However, 
a majority of the members consider that the WTO law should not be amended as to include 
trade measures of MEAs.  
 
A clarification of the relationship between the WTO and MEAs may be vital not only to 
prevent potential conflicts and to increase the attractiveness of multilateralism but also to 
create a clearer policy-making environment, especially for MEA negotiators, and to provide 
greater legal certainty for MEAs as well as the WTO.
241
 On the contrary, an absence of a 
clarification of the relationship may bring “a chilling effect” of WTO provisions on the 
negotiation as well as the implementation of MEAs why such a development may restrict the 
furtherance of such agreements.
242
 Moreover, the WTO is even seen by environmental 
activists as undermining necessary environmental legislation.
243
 
 
Some advocate that the equality of the WTO and MEAs needs to be acknowledged. Such 
equality is argued to be supported by a coherent policy development at a national level to 
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ensure that these agreements are mutually supportive.
244
  As most environmental policies are 
implemented at a national level, it may also seem important to maintain national authority to 
enforce such standards.
245
 Moreover, the question on how to clarify this relationship would 
probably be best dealt with if it would not be addressed only within the WTO, but also within 
MEAs. This may seem natural as a formal WTO dispute, involving MEA rules, probably 
would have serious implications for both systems of governance.
246
  
 
Additionally, some argue that the creation of a linkage between trade and environmental 
issues is a way for the developed countries to introduce higher standards for the protection of 
the environment and to impose protectionist measures against cheaper imports from 
developing countries thus maintaining their dominant position in the international trading 
regime.
247
 On the contrary, developed countries fear that their competitive position would be 
eroded in the absence of such a link as pollution intensive industries then would move to 
countries with lower standards. This view is shared by environmentalists, who envisage that a 
race to the bottom would follow due to increasing trade integration and competition for 
investment and jobs. By ensuring a level playing field for all exporters and by introducing 
binding environmental standards, preferably within the WTO system, it can be avoided that 
developed countries would desire to open up additional avenues for unilateral actions.
248
 
Additionally, it is striking that article XX of the GATT leaves room for interpretation and 
arbitrariness, which may explain the reactions to the increasing consideration of environment-
al interests as conflicting with the interest of trade liberalization. 
 
In the following some proposals on how to clarify the WTO-MEA relationship will be 
presented. These proposals have in common that they, even though they differ in various 
aspects, all support the WTO as acting on a multilateral level for the protection of the environ-
ment.
249
 
 
                                                 
244
 The relationship between MEAs and the WTO: Where are the negotiations heading? WTO Symposium: 
Challenges ahead on the road to Cancún, Summary Report. 
245
 Harris, J, Trade and the Environment. 
246
 The relationship between MEAs and the WTO: Where are the negotiations heading? WTO Symposium: 
Challenges ahead on the road to Cancún, Summary Report. 
247
 Emmert, F, Labor, Environmental Standards and World Trade Law, page 77. 
248
 Brack, D and Gray, K, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO, page 29 and Busse, M, Trade, 
Environmental Regulations and the World Trade Organization: New Empirical Evidence, page 285 and 297.  
249
 See also Abdel Motaal, D, Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO Rules, Why the 
“Burden of Accommodation” Should Shift to MEAs, page 1218ff, for a similar classification.  
- 65 - 
 
6.1.1 The Status Quo Approach 
Firstly, the so-called “status quo” approach, which is generally accepted among developing 
countries and the United States, advocates that the relationship between the WTO and MEAs 
should be clarified without any amendments to WTO law. The advocates of this approach 
consider that article XX of the GATT already gives sufficient space for interaction between 
WTO and MEA rules and that no further consideration of environmental concerns is needed. 
Moreover, they think that the so far absence of disputes concerning trade measures applied 
pursuant to a MEA suggests that there is no such need. Moreover, it is considered that if such 
a conflict would be brought before the WTO its’ dispute settlement mechanisms would be 
capable of settling that dispute. Furthermore, the position taken by the US could be explained 
by the fact that the US is not party to several MEAs why the US does not want to legitimate 
such MEAs under the WTO.
250
   
 
6.1.2 The Waiver Approach 
The second so called “waiver” approach suggests that members could get authorized to 
deviate from their WTO obligations under a limited period of time through a decision taken 
by the WTO members. Any compatibility problems would be best dealt with on a case-by-
case basis as trade restrictive measures for the protection of the environment could already be 
imposed in accordance with the rules under the WTO. Such a waiver is suggested to be 
adopted by consensus but without any need for ratification by each WTO member. Examples 
of countries supporting this view are ASEAN, Canada, Japan and New Zealand.
251
 
 
6.1.3 Clarification of WTO Rules 
Thirdly, an approach advocating a “clarification of WTO rules” has been proposed. This is 
suggested to be done through either the adoption of general guidelines on how the relationship 
should be understood or the amendment to WTO rules. Regarding an amendment, the parties 
to MEAs are politically more likely to have a better opportunity to amend their agreements. 
Nevertheless, such an amendment would only benefit relations between parties to that 
agreement. On the contrary, an amendment to the WTO is a more powerful alternative, which 
also regards if another of the WTO’s binding mechanisms, such as a waiver, would be used. 
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To date, it seems unlikely that the WTO members would be ready to take such actions.
252
 
Additionally, criteria of different kinds have been proposed for enabling predictability of 
guidelines. For instance, it has been proposed to clarify the relationship through the 
development of specific criteria or a list of attributes to be used when deciding whether trade 
measures of MEAs shall be justified under article XX of the GATT. According to this 
proposal, a measure would be justified where these criteria are fulfilled and do not conflict 
with the preamble to article XX.
253
 
 
6.1.4 Clarifying the WTO–MEA Relationship along the Lines of Co-operation 
Finally, the fourth approach contains the idea of “clarifying the WTO–MEA relationship 
along the lines of co-operation”. This approach has been supported by several members and 
could, as suggested by Switzerland, be possible through a “general approach of mutual 
supportiveness and deference”.254 This view could be interpreted as advocating a lack of 
hierarchy between the WTO and MEAs why unnecessary conflicts could be avoided as a 
consequence of an increasing predictability and legal certainty. Therefore, an amendment to 
WTO rules deems unnecessary and a clarification seems sufficient. Such an approach 
involves that the respective agreements (the WTO and MEAs) should concentrate on its 
competence and not on the competence of the others.
255
   
 
Also the EC has expressed a similar approach by noting that “the most effective way to tackle 
global environmental issues is through a negotiated agreement which includes concerted and 
multilaterally agreed solutions”.256 All countries are proposed to be included from the 
establishment of such a multilateral agreement as a way to create an agreement only 
containing trade measures, which have been negotiated and agreed by consensus. The EC 
finds this alternative to best guarantee against discriminatory as well as protectionist 
actions.
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6.1.5 The Development of a Voluntary Consultative Mechanism 
In addition, it has been proposed to develop a voluntary consultative mechanism, which 
would examine if a measure is the most effective one to fulfil the specific aim of 
environmental protection. This determination would be made before a trade measure is 
applied or negotiated. Such a mechanism could facilitate mutual as well as policy 
understanding.
258
 
 
6.2 Proposals Regarding Dispute Resolution 
6.2.1 Increased Influence for MEA Secretariats  
Regarding conflicts of jurisdictions, there is no consensus on how to handle such situations. 
However, several proposals have been made on how to solve such conflicts as well as how to 
improve the WTO dispute-settling mechanisms to better tackle disputes regarding environ-
mental issues.
259
 Firstly, the influence of MEA Secretariats has been proposed to increase, 
which could be done through inviting them to send comments and to participate on 
consultations.
260
 Moreover, the mentioned article 13 of the DSU could be used as to request 
information from MEA Secretariats. This was done in the Shrimp-Turtle case where the 
Appellate Body interpreted article 13 of the DSU as to allow panels to consider also non-
requested submission from non-members.
261
 This proposal may, with reference to the MEAs’ 
expertise, involve better possibilities in assessing compliance with a MEA, which in turn may 
facilitate the panel process.  
 
6.2.2 Environmental Experts 
Additionally, environmental experts could be used in other environmental related disputes, 
even where not covered by a specific MEA, as to on an early stage gather evidence facilitating 
the later process. This could be seen as a way to settle disputes in a mutually agreed manner. 
It has also been proposed to settle an agreement on environment including specific provisions 
regarding the selection of experts and panellists for the panel process.
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6.2.3 The ICJ 
Moreover, the ICJ has been proposed to review disputes regarding a predetermined list of 
environmental treaties, as in CITES. This as the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms only 
may enforce WTO law. Consequently, the ICJ might be a suitable forum to decide on certain 
matters of non-WTO law. Furthermore, the ICJ could provide a non-binding opinion on the 
relationship between the WTO and MEAs. However, some argue that this would necessitate 
an amendment to article 23 of the DSU obliging WTO members to file any dispute relating to 
the WTO provisions to the WTO.
263
 On the contrary, some argue that an amendment to article 
23.1 of the DSU would not be necessary as such a situation would not involve “a violation of 
obligations or other nullification or impairment of … the attainment of any objective of the 
covered agreements”. Additionally, an ICJ ruling could be based on an adversarial 
proceeding, article 36:1 of the ICJ Statute, or on an advisory opinion, article 65:1 of the ICJ 
Statute. Regarding the former, it could only be initiated by states as only they can be parties to 
such proceedings. Therefore, it would be necessary to establish a general rule of international 
law stating that matters of conflicting jurisdiction shall be brought to the ICJ.
264
 
 
6.2.4 Article 5 of the DSU 
Article 5 of the DSU has been argued to be furthered as to prevent trade and environment 
disputes from turning into formal WTO trade disputes. This could be done through a WTO 
instrument recalling article 5 of the DSU regarding mediation, conciliation and good offices 
as to encourage the members to exhaust all non-binding WTO remedies before invoking their 
right to formal dispute settlement proceedings. To date, article 5 has not been used why 
amendments to the available mechanism should be considered. However, as it concerns an 
informal process no changes of WTO law are required as operating outside the formal WTO 
structure. Subsequently, this proposal could provide the parties with a negotiated informal 
settlement to a lesser expense.
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6.2.5 Environment Advisory Board 
In addition, an Environment Advisory Board has been proposed to be established within the 
WTO regime, similar to the Textile Monitoring Body. Accordingly, the parties to a dispute 
could be obliged to expose their complaint to a specialist body that makes a recommendation 
about the dispute, before a party not satisfied with the recommendation could pursue formal 
dispute settlement proceedings.
266
  
 
6.2.6 Expansion of the WTO Provisions in Parallel with MEAs’ Mechanisms 
Furthermore, the non-compliance and dispute settling mechanisms of MEAs have been 
proposed to be strengthened as to enhance their effective implementation through an expan-
sion of the WTO dispute avoidance provisions in parallel with the non-compliance mechan-
isms of MEAs. This should be done in order to reinforce the dispute settlement mechanisms 
of other treaties and to not cause the objectives of MEAs negative effects. However, such a 
development demands the WTO members to provide for treaties dealing with non-economic 
issues to establish dispute-settling mechanisms as powerful as the WTO mechanisms.
267
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7 Conclusions 
With regard to the absence of explicit regulations and a formal WTO dispute involving trade 
measures set out in a MEA, the question of how conflicts between the WTO and MEAs 
should be resolved is mainly left unanswered. However, norms and principles of international 
law have undoubtedly to be considered in most cases when interpreting WTO rules. The 
general principle against conflicting interpretation, the principle of good faith as well as the 
fact that the covered agreements could not be read in clinical isolation from other interna-
tional law speaks for that MEAs in most cases will affect the content of WTO law. Regarding 
allegations of conflict between substantive norms of the WTO agreements and other treaties, 
the adjudicating bodies of the WTO have the obligation to consider all relevant rules of 
international law that are applicable between the disputing WTO members when interpreting 
WTO provisions. As WTO law constitutes nothing but a part of international law, it may seem 
logical to interpret WTO law in a wider context of international law. This should at least be 
the case for such norms representing the common intensions of all WTO members. Therefore, 
for example the principle against conflicting interpretation should be considered why WTO 
law normally should be read as to avoid conflict with other treaty provisions.
268
 As the WTO 
treaty is of “living” nature, evolutionary interpretations may seem possible. However, the 
general limitations on treaty interpretation apply.  
 
To give an example, the outcome of WTO disputes can be significantly influenced by the 
decision-making mechanisms of MEAs as through an interpretation of a decision taken by a 
MEA body as evidence of a justification under article XX of the GATT. The same regards an 
application of article 13 of the DSU, involving a request by the WTO dispute-settling 
mechanisms for information from a MEA secretariat on relevant matters. Additionally, 
MEAs’ provisions may be used as to base a defence under article XX of the GATT or likely 
before the WTO dispute-settling mechanism. Hence, a WTO member’s participation in a 
MEA might become relevant when the WTO adjudicating bodies decide whether compliance 
with Article XX of GATT is assessed or not. Furthermore, provisions of a MEA may be 
invoked as a justification for not complying with WTO obligations.  
 
Despite that the jurisdiction of the WTO is limited to the covered agreements, other rules of 
international law, where binding between the disputing parties, might not only be considered 
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for treaty interpretation but also as applicable law before the WTO. As the WTO provisions 
are reciprocal, a deviation is possible as long as third parties’ rights are not breached. 
Therefore, non-WTO law, involving for instance environmental concerns, may prevail over 
WTO provisions as the diversity of WTO members’ interests and needs shall be accounted for 
with reference to the nature of the WTO provisions. Additionally, provisions of MEAs like 
CITES may prevail with reference to the principles of lex specialis and lex posterior. 
However, a decision on letting a MEA provision prevail over WTO law does not involve to 
judicially enforce compliance with such non-WTO law. Subsequently, non-WTO law could 
be used as a valid legal defence as part of the applicable law but could never be used as to 
base claims before the WTO as not constituting a covered agreement.   
 
Furthermore, the limitation of the WTO dispute-settling mechanisms to not “add to or 
diminish rights and obligations of the WTO” may result in a decision that no WTO law is 
applicable between the parties. Accordingly, a MEA may supersede the relevant WTO 
provision why the WTO dispute-settling mechanism may decline jurisdiction. On the 
contrary, it may be concluded that jurisdiction is not declined but that a claim concerning a 
WTO violation instead is rejected, where not involving either an amendment to the limitation 
in articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU or a breach of the rights of third WTO members.  
 
Concerning overlaps or conflicts of jurisdictions, no agreed solution exists on how such 
situations should be solved. The same holds true for the availability of different dispute 
avoidance mechanisms. Furthermore, counter-measures applied as punishment to parties of a 
MEA that refuses to respect the conclusion of a MEA dispute settlement report may be found 
violating article 23 of the DSU as constituting a trade restriction applied outside the WTO 
institutional framework. Due to the extensive reach of article 23 of the DSU, and the character 
of the DSU process, WTO members would most probably have to negotiate and agree on the 
circumstances in which disputing parties would be obliged to exhaust the prior mechanisms of 
for instance MEAs before they are allowed to trigger the WTO dispute mechanisms. 
 
7.1 CITES   
Obviously, factual conflicts may arise between the WTO regime and trade-affecting measures 
set out in CITES, which partly may be explained by the agreements’ differing objectives. 
Regarding the trade affecting measures in CITES, which may violate the WTO in form of an 
infringement of for example GATT article I (the MFN-principle), article III (the national 
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treatment principle), article XI (the prohibition on quantitative restrictions) or article XIII 
(non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions), they may be justified with 
reference to the general exceptions under article XX of the GATT. To give an example the 
mentioned usage of quantitative restrictions to regulate leopard trade could be mentioned. 
Such a WTO violation may be justified with reference to article XX (b) of the GATT as 
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”, as neither disguised because of 
the clear purpose of the measure nor appeared to be unjustified or arbitrary. Additionally, the 
measure can be seen as necessary as a quantitative restriction in comparison with a complete 
prohibition according to the necessity test would turn out to be the least GATT inconsistent 
measure available.
269
 Additionally, articles III-VI as well as articles XIV and XVIII.1 of 
CITES may be justified with reference to similar justifications under article XX of the GATT.  
 
The outcome of disputes involving the question of whether a justification based in CITES is 
possible under article XX of the GATT is uncertain. Firstly, it is unclear how far the WTO 
dispute-settling mechanisms would go in examining the criteria of article XX. A presumption 
may be made including that an international consensus exists on the validity and necessity of 
the instruments contained in CITES. Regarding CITES, foremost the extensive membership 
of the convention makes it accurate to argue that the convention is based on an international 
consensus why such a justification in CITES should be found valid. However, the panel may 
also consider its mandate limited to only examine WTO provisions thus excluding other 
international agreements from their jurisdiction. Additionally, the variation of differing 
outcomes  in such disputes have complicated the application of environmentally friendly trade 
measures and few such measures are likely to fulfil the requirements set out by the panels.
270
 
 
Also trade restrictive measures directed at non-complying parties may be justified under 
article XX of the GATT. This as a result of that the provisions could not be seen as arbitrary 
or unjustifiable as they apply only to countries not complying with the substantive CITES 
provisions and do not depend on their status as parties or non-parties. However, measures 
automatically prohibiting non-complying parties to trade with parties might be argued as 
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discriminatory.
271
 Additionally, such measures might not constitute “disguised restrictions on 
international trade” prohibited by the preamble to article XX where there is a clear link 
between the realization of the goals of CITES and the use of trade measures. Furthermore, the 
necessity test might involve difficult requirements as other reasonably available options might 
exist. Since CITES recommends trade, with non-parties in Appendix I specimens, only in 
special cases after consultation with the Secretariat and as parties are treated differently 
without any satisfactory explanation, these provisions may not be seen as necessary within the 
meaning of article XX (b). Concerning provisions designed to change the practices and 
policies of non-parties, the Tuna/Dolphin panel ruled that measures designed to achieve their 
goals only through changes in another country’s jurisdiction could not be seen as “necessary 
to protect human, animal, or plant life or health”.272 Additionally, provisions that are 
designed as to increase the MEA’s membership, and not to protect species, should not be 
covered by the general exceptions in article XX.  
 
Anyhow, the participation in CITES is widespread and to be able to provide an effective 
protection, trade with non-complying non-parties needs to be possible. Consequently, it seems 
natural to argue that the trade restrictive measures contained in CITES, which are directed at 
non-parties, should be given greater deference than unilateral measures. Similar provisions in 
the Montreal Protocol have, by the GATT Secretariat, been found consistent with article XX 
of the GATT.
273
 Additionally, it seems unlikely that measures authorized by a MEA would be 
challenged before the WTO in situations where measures, strictly based on the text of the 
Convention or on the consensus of the parties to CITES, are applied by and among its parties. 
It may also be argued that conflicts between the WTO and CITES probably will be solved in a 
satisfactory manner, as it, because of the extensive membership of CITES, might seem 
accurate to assume that disputed matters will be worked out within CITES.
274
 
 
In situations of irreconcilable conflicts and where both disputing parties are members of 
CITES as well as the WTO, CITES may prevail with reference to principles of customary 
international law. As the conflicting agreements cover the same subject matter, CITES should, 
according to the principle of lex posterior, prevail as constituting the agreement later in 
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time.
275
 However, GATT 1947 clearly postdates CITES while GATT 1994 does not. 
Nevertheless, CITES could be argued to prevail over GATT 1994 with reference to the 
principle of lex specialis, as constituting the more specific agreement.
276
 On the contrary, it 
seems regarding conflicts between WTO members, where both are not members of CITES, 
not accurate to apply the principles of lex posterior and lex specialis, as not constituting a part 
of the applicable law between the parties. However, the fact that non-WTO law prevails over 
WTO law, does not imply that the WTO law has to judicially enforce compliance with those 
non-WTO rules. Conclusively, it seems possible to use non-WTO rules as CITES as a valid 
legal defence against WTO violations but not as to base legal claims before the WTO because 
of that the jurisdiction of the WTO is limited to the covered agreements.     
 
7.2 The Kyoto Protocol  
As the Kyoto Protocol does not explicitly impose any trade affecting measures, conflicts are 
not as obvious as regarding CITES. However, this paper has shown examples of potential 
conflicts that may arise between the Protocol and the WTO system. It is for instance doubtful 
whether protectionist measures imposed against non-parties with reference to the Kyoto 
Protocol, for either not being a party or for not applying the treaty correctly or in order to 
prevent the existence of free-riders, as to implement the Protocol would be found violating the 
WTO.  
 
As the grounds to which the WTO dispute-settling mechanisms refer to when deciding 
whether a measure violating the WTO shall be justified under article XX of the GATT vary, it 
remains uncertain how several of the mentioned conflicts in this paper should be resolved. 
Furthermore, the outcome of such disputes is depending on the interpretation of several 
factors. It would, for example, probably matter whether a trade measure is grounded in a 
treaty obligation or a national policy. Regarding trade measures grounded in the Kyoto 
Protocol, such measures would probably be seen as actions on a national level. This as the 
Protocol’s language suggests that its trade measures only are required or authorized to 
promote membership, enforce the treaty or make the climate regime itself more effective. 
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Additionally, it seems doubtful that the WTO regime would address climate change issues to 
a further extent than the Protocol itself.
277
  
 
Nevertheless, the Kyoto Protocol may without having to be justified in terms of an 
interpretation of the covered agreement be considered as applicable law or evidence of 
compliance.
278
 This could be the case where a party to the Kyoto Protocol refer to fulfilments 
of its commitments under the Protocol. To give an example, justifications based in the 
Protocol in cases regarding non-party participation should be found valid with reference to 
article 18 of the Vienna Convention as the signatories of UNFCCC or the Protocol that have 
not ratified one or both of them are obliged to act in a way not defeating their object and 
purpose. Moreover, measures directed at non-parties may not constitute part of the applicable 
law, as both parties are not bound by it, but may be invoked as a part of the factual analysis of 
the circumstances of a dispute. However, it is not possible to base a claim on non-WTO law 
with reference foremost to the limited jurisdiction of the WTO and articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the 
DSU. Nonetheless, it seems logical to consider provisions of the Protocol to some extent 
regarding justifications under article XX of the GATT as these exceptions might permit the 
imposition of some trade-affecting measures even in the absence of a MEA.   
 
7.3 The Future  
Regarding how the WTO-MEA relationship should be clarified, the “status-quo” approach 
may not constitute an accurate solution as it seems insufficient to not create a link between 
trade and environmental issues. The relationship between WTO rules and trade-restrictive 
MEAs has to be clarified. If this should be done through the implementation of a waiver or by 
the establishment of a voluntary consultative mechanism etcetera is hard to decide. But it 
would probably be appropriate if an environmental specialised body would deal with the 
creation of environmental standards. The approach involving a clarification of the WTO-
MEA relationship along the lines of co-operation and not through an amendment to the WTO 
rules seems very satisfying. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that such a 
development relies on mutual trust and the outcome may depend on the strengths of the 
respective countries, which may be disadvantageous for developing countries. Additionally, it 
seems to be a urgent need for an adoption of guidelines, preferably binding ones, on how 
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especially the Kyoto Protocol should be interpreted and implemented as to strengthen its 
covered issues. For instance a uniform approach to the taxation of energy and greenhouse gas 
emissions would be of importance as to avoid the use of climate measures for protectionist 
purposes. This regards especially border adjustments of exports and imports.
279
 
 
Concerning the dispute-settling mechanisms of the WTO, they are clearly the most effective 
and well developed. However, the areas of competence of the WTO are naturally limited. 
When it comes to questions of, for example, complex environmental issues, the WTO system 
is not equipped with enough resources to solve such matters in a satisfactory manner. At the 
same time, the adjudicating bodies of the WTO could be overburdened if they should handle 
also such matters, which in turn could undermine the whole system. Such a development 
could not be desirable as the current strengths of the WTO dispute-settling system could get 
badly affected. Instead it seems accurate to strengthen the compliance and dispute settlement 
mechanisms of MEAs as to enhance the effective implementation of MEAs. Moreover, the 
possibilities for mutual supportiveness would then increase as the risk for challenges before 
the WTO would decline. Furthermore, the WTO mechanisms should be improved as to ensure 
considerations of the MEAs’ expertise. Consequently, it seems logical that the WTO regime 
should stay within its mandate and that it should not be extended to also cover other non-trade 
related issues. Instead, the different international organizations shall continue to work within 
their respective field of competence.  
 
Furthermore, environmental issues should be given the highest priority and violations of the 
Kyoto Protocol should be fully sanctioned. Therefore, provisions on sanctions against 
wrongdoing parties have to be included in the Protocol as a complex arbitration or court 
process otherwise seems less meaningful. Regarding the proposals on arbitration, I personally 
believe with reference to how the judges are chosen that such a process would result in a 
compromise of the disputing matters not completely appropriate for the issues covered by the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, irrespectively of which forum that settles a dispute, all relevant 
international rules applicable between the disputing parties should be considered as to settle 
the dispute in accordance with international law. Therefore, provisions set out in for instance 
CITES or the Kyoto Protocol should be considered where appropriate.  
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Concerning the case-studies, it is important to recognize that while CITES violations could 
constitute criminal acts, the environmental issues covered by the Kyoto Protocol are neither 
sanctioned nor acknowledged to the same extent. As endangerment and extinction constitute 
apparent problems, it is certainly easier to put effort on solving such problems as it is easier to 
find a suitable and effective solution to them as well as it would not demand immense efforts. 
The matters included in the Kyoto Protocol are rather diffuse what concerns their cause as 
well as their effects why a solution or at least a powerful protection from the threats with the 
current very high levels of greenhouse gas emissions has not been furthered in the same way. 
Additionally, the difficulties in locating the sources of the threats regarding greenhouse gas 
emissions worsen the problem. Moreover, the problems with the current levels of greenhouse 
gases and their consequences for the future are not even commonly agreed upon. However, 
none of these arguments speaks for that the Kyoto Protocol issues should not be given the 
highest priority.  
 
The future of the Kyoto Protocol will most likely be vitally influenced by the results of the 
United Nations Climate Change Conference that will be held in Copenhagen in December this 
year in order to conclude the “new” Kyoto protocol. With reference to the newly published 
negotiating texts it seems as the flexible mechanisms under the current protocol will be 
further standardized and that different guidelines and criteria regarding the implementation of 
these mechanisms will be introduced. Moreover, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice is requested to present recommendations regarding numerous issues 
covered by the Protocol.
280
 These negotiating texts constitute a valuable tool for the coming 
discussions and contain several proposals for the “new” Kyoto Protocol. However, these 
negotiating texts seem very speculative as the parties’ intentions seem to differ and as the 
content of these texts will be further discussed at sessions of negotiations before the Copen-
hagen Conference. Consequently, the future will have to show how far the Protocol’s parties 
are prepared to go.  
     
*** 
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Last but not least it is important to be aware of that the struggle for the protection of the 
environment may first negatively effect trade liberalisation. Nevertheless, the effects may be 
the opposite in the long run as a healthy environment is a necessity for a healthy world 
economy and a prerequisite for a further liberalisation of world trade. If no actions are taken 
to deal with the environmental problems, increased tensions would be caused between nations 
as a result of for example drought, lack of water and food and other related concerns. Such 
problems would most probably strike harder on developing countries. Therefore, developing 
countries will need to be supported by the more developed and financially stronger countries 
in the fight against environmental destruction.  
 
Conclusively, it should be stated that there is no time to lose in the “battle” of our environ-
ment. The increasing divides between the WTO members make a solution to seem far away. 
As the dividing line between environmental protection and protectionism may be hard to 
discern, a consensus on how to handle the issues presented in this paper has to be reached to 
at least prevent an increase in unilateral actions which in turn may undermine the WTO 
system. As the protection of the environment concerns a global problem, it has to be dealt 
with at a global level. Additionally, the furtherance of environmental standards primarily 
takes place at a national level why the clarification of the relationship must be supported inter-
nationally as well as nationally. The relationship between the WTO and MEAs needs to be 
clarified, not through the creation of a hierarchy between them as it could undermine vital 
environmental legislation but through multilateral negotiations. Such negotiations are 
probably best solved outside the WTO system, not only as the WTO dispute settlement bodies 
are restricted in their jurisdictional power in several ways but also as these issues have to be 
solved taking into account further interests than trade liberalization. 
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